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A SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE OF THE LAW OF
PEACEFUL PICKETING IN NEW YORK
EMIL SCHLESINGERt

COMPLETE

candor compels the introductory observation that the
present law of New York respecting peaceful picketing in labor
disputes* is in a state of general uncertainty. It is undoubtedly true
that the courts of original jurisdiction, and often the Appellate Divisions,
and less frequently the Court of Appeals, have, by their decisions, attempted to create specific formulae in which to fit the facts of particular
cases. But these formulae have been entirely artificial; there has not
emerged any general understanding or solution of the problems involved. The Supreme Court of the United States has suffered from the
same infirmity. Having made a complete identification of picketing
with free speech in Thornhill v. Alabama' and American Federation of
Labor et al. v. Swing et al.,2 it then began to recede steadily in subsequent
cases from the position which it had taken, and to such an extent, that
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's declaration in Milk Wagon Drivers' Union
et al. v. Meadowmoor Dairies3 that "picketing is the workingman's
means of communication" has lost much of its significance. Indeed, in
Hughes et al. v. Superior Court,' the learned justice vigorously opposed
the use of generalizations and efforts to establish a set of principles to
guide decisions in future picketing cases and insisted that "Lawmaking
is essentially empirical and tentative, and in adjudication as in legislation the Constitution does not forbid 'cautious advance, step by step,
and the distrust of generalities'. . . . Generalizations are treacherous
in the application of large constitutional concepts."
Therefore, until the New York higher courts and the Supreme
Court of the United States have spoken with more authority on a
greater number of factual picketing situations, the law of New York
will continue to be blurred and indecisive. In the meantime, injunctions
against peaceful picketing are likely to continue in cases which were
originally thought to be within the allowable area of economic conflict.
Prior to 1932, the abuse of the injunction in labor disputes throughout the United States had become so widespread and notorious that
it soon began to be characterized as "government by injunction." In
1914, a legislative effort was made on the national level to stem the tide.
t Member of New York Bar.
* This article does not include the subject of picketing in secondary boycott situations.
1. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).

2. 312 U.s. 321 (1941).
3. 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
4. 339 U.S. 460, 469 (1951).
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The Clayton Act was enacted, which seemingly provided procedural
safeguards and immunized certain types of labor controversies and
activities from injunctive restraint. The trade union movement hailed
it as "Labor's Magna Charta."O But its exuberance was short lived.
In the first cases to reach the Supreme Court of the United States for
interpretation, the majority ruled in substance that the statute was
merely "declaratory of the law as it stood before,"' "declaratory of
what was the best practice always.""
It is not generally known, but it is nevertheless a fact, that Frankfurter and Greene's book The Labor Inljunction, which has since become a classic in labor law, originally started as a legal study and brief
in support of a bill which the authors had drafted for introduction in
the Congress of the United States to regulate the use of injunctions in
labor disputes-a bill which, with some modifications, was subsequently
enacted into law in 1932 and became known as the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. It represented "the culmination of a bitter political, social and
economic controversy extending over half a century ... The Congress
made abundantly clear their intention that what they regarded as the
misinterpretation (by the courts) of the Clayton Act should not be
repeated in the construction of the Norris-LaGuardia Act."'

I
Even before the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act the New
York Court of Appeals had achieved a measure of recognition for its
liberality in labor cases even though, from time to time, some of the
lower courts made specious distinctions upon which to base unfavorable
rulings against labor unions in picketing cases.
As early as 1902, in National Protective Association et al. v. Cumming et al., 10 and fifteen years later, in Bosscrt et al. V.Dkiny et al.,"
it recognized and reiterated the principle that workingmen have the
right to organize, to strike and to picket on any ground which they
deemed to be sufficient so long as their purpose was to better their
conditions of labor and not, through malice or otherwise, to injure their
employer. Resulting injury was deemed incidental and damnum absque
5. 38 STAT. 731, 15 U.S.C. § 14 et seq. (1914).
6. GoN,"ERs, SEvms, YEARS Or Lwr Aim LABOR 299 (1943).
7. Duplex Printing Press Co. et al. v. Deering et al., 254 U.S. 443, 470 (1921).
8. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council et ci., 257 U.S.

184, 203 (1921).
9.
ik Wagon Drivers Uni6n et al. v. Lake Valley Farm Products Inc. et al., 311
U.S. 91, 102, 103 (1940).
10. 170 N.Y. 315, 63 N.E. 369 (1902).
11. 221 N.Y. 342, 117 N.E. 582 (1917).
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injuria. This was an even more generous concept than that which had
been urged by Mr. Justice Holmes in one of his famous dissents.12
Despite these decisions, the lower courts of New York continued
to inflict heavy blows on organized labor by granting injunctions upon
new theories which they quickly developed. They held that there could
be no picketing, no matter how peaceful, in the absence of a strike,
and that there could be no strike unless the workers of the employer
involved had actually honored the union's request to quit work. 13 In
addition, they enjoined all picketing which in any way interfered with
the performance of a "yellow dog" contract.1 4
Possibly the political climate prevalent at the time, the results of
the election returns, the economic predilections of the judge deciding
the particular case, may have influenced these decisions. If they looked
for a peg on which tq hang their views, anti-labor judges easily found
it in the anti-labor decisions of that day of the Supreme Court of the
United States in the Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. case16 (which sus12. While still a member of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts the learned
Justice had stated, in Vegelahn v. Guntner et al., 167 Mass. 92, 105, 106, 44 N.E. 1077,
1080 (1896),
"... when a plaintiff proves that several persons have combined and conspired to
injure his business, and have done acts providing that effect, he shows temporal damage
and a cause of action, unless the facts disclose or the defendants prove some ground
of excuse or justification, . . .
"Nevertheless, in numberless instances the law 'warrants the intentional infliction of
temporal damage, because it regards it as justified. It is on the question of what shall
amount to a justification, and more especially on the nature of the considerations which
really determine or ought to determine the answer to that question, that judicial reasoning seems to me often to be inadequate. The true grounds of decisions are considerations
of policy and of social advantage, and it is vain to suppose that solutions can be attained merely by logic and general propositions of law which nobody disputes. Propositions as to public policy rarely are unanimously accepted, and still more rarely, If
ever, are capable of unanswerable proof. They require a special training to enable
anyone even to form an intelligent opinion about them."
Here, again, Mr. justice Holmes was far ahead of his time. His prophetic vision came
to realization some forty years later when Congress and state legislatures created special
boards of experts to resolve the problems which might arise under the respective labormanagement laws which they had, in the meantime, enacted.
13. L. Daitch & Co. v. Cohen, 218 App. Div. 80, 217 N.Y. Supp. 817 (1st Dep't
1926); Cushman's Sons Inc. v. Amalgamated Food Workers' Bakers, 127 Misc. 152,
215 N.Y. Supp. 401 (Sup. Ct. 1926); Public Baking Co. v. Stern, 127 Misc. 229, 215 N.Y.
Supp. 537 (Sup. Ct. 1926); Traub Amusement Co. v. Macker, 127 Misc. 335, 215 N.Y.
Supp. 397 (Sup. Ct. 1925); Bolivian Panama Co. v. Finkelstein, 127 Misc. 337, 215 N.Y.
Supp. 399 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
14. Altman v. Schlesinger, 204 App. Div. 513, 198 N.Y. Supp. 128 (Ist Dep't 1923);
Vail-Ballou Press v. Casey, 125 Misc. 689, 212 N.Y. Supp. 113 (Sup. Ct. 1906). See
also People v. Marcus, 185 N.Y. 257, 77 N.E. 1177 (1906), holding unconstitutional
a statute making it a criminal offense to coerce workers to enter into a "yellow dog"
contract.
15. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917).
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tained the "yellow dog" contract) and in the Duplex Printing Press
Company 6 and the Bedford Cut Stone' 7 cases (which limited picketing to situations in which the labor disputants stood in the proximate
relation of employer and employee).
The Court of Appeals, in the first case on the subject to come before
it, reversed the superficial thinking of the courts below. At the same
time it by-passed the principles enunciated in the Cumming and Bossert
cases and substituted the doctrine of legality of means and ends as
a basis for justification of temporal damage caused by the activities
of a union. In 1927, in Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin et al.,' the court held:
"The purpose of a labor union to improve the conditions under which its members
do their work; to increase their wages; to assist them in other ways, may justify
what would otherwise be a wrong. So would an effort to increase its numbers and
to unionize an entire trade or business. It may be as interested in the wages of
those not members, or in the conditions under which they work as in its own members because of the influence of one upon the other. All engaged in a trade are
affected by the prevailing rate of wages. All, by the principle of collective bargaining. Economic organization today is not based on the single shop. Unions believe
that wages may be increased, collective bargaining maintained only if union conditions prevail, not in some single factory, but generally. That they may prevail
it may call a strike and picket the premises of an employer with the intent of inducing him to employ only union labor. And it may adopt either method separately.
Picketing without a strike is no more unlawful than a strike without picketing. Both
are based upon a lawful purpose. Resulting injury is incidental and must be
endured."

It may be noted, parenthetically, that some years later the Supreme
Court of the United States in American Federation of Labor et al. v.
S ing et al.,' 9 arrived at the same result. In reversing an injunction
which had been sustained by the highest court of the State of Illinois,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority of the Court, stated:
"A state cannot exclude workingmen from peacefully exercising the right of free
communication by drawing the circle of economic competition between employers
and workers so small as to contain only an employer and those directly employed
by him. The interdependence of economic interest of all engaged in the same
industry has become a commonplace. .

.

.The right of free communication cannot

in a dispute with an employer,
therefore be mutilated by denying it to workers,
0
even though they are not in his employ."' 9

Under such circumstances, peaceful picketing was declared to be
constitutionally protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.
16. Duplex Printing Press Co. et al. v. Deering et al, 2S4 U.S. 443 (1921).
17. Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. journeymen Stone Cutters Ass'n et al., 274 U.S. 37
(1927).
18. 245 N.Y. 260, 263, 157 N.E. 130, 132, 133 (1927).
19. 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
19a. Id. at 326.
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In 1932, five years after the decision in the Exchange Bakery case,
the Court of Appeals, in Stillwell Theatre v. Kaplan,2° expanded its
philosophy still further. That case involved a jurisdictional dispute between two unions of motion picture operators. One of these unions
had entered into a contract with the plaintiff. Thereupon, defendant
union peacefully picketed the plaintiff for the purpose of inducing it to
employ members of that union. Special Term2 ' enjoined the picketing
upon the ground that its purpose was to induce a breach of the existing
contract between plaintiff and the rival union and was, therefore, illegal. The Appellate Division affirmed.2 1 In voicing disagreement
with these rulings, the Court of Appeals declaredm3 that the defendant
union's conduct was "within the allowable area of economic conflict"
and that "the interests of capital and labor are at times inimical and
the courts may not decide controversies between the parties so long
as neither resorts to violence, deceit or misrepresentation to bring
about desired results."
It concluded that:
"We would .. .give to one labor union an advantage over another by prohibiting
the use of peaceful and honest persuasion in matters of economic and social

rivalry. This might strike a death blow to legitimate labor activities. It is not
courts to restrain conduct which is within the allowable
within the province of the 24
area of economic conflict."
A year earlier, Chief Judge Cardozo declared in Nann v. Raimist2 5
that a union had an "indubitable right to win converts over to its fold
by recourse to peaceable persuasion, and to induce them by like
methods to renounce allegiance to its rival," and that "What is wrong
must be so clearly wrong that only 'disinterested malevolence' . . . or

something close akin thereto, can have supplied the motive power ....
"
If less than this appears, a court of equity will stand aside -15*
Generally speaking, the legal climate of labor-management relations
in the State of New York prior to the enactment by Congress of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act2" in 1932 was as follows: employers were under
no legal compulsion to bargain collectively, company dominated unions
were not unlawful, stranger picketing was recognized, closed shop contracts were valid even though the union represented only a minority or
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
25a.
26.

259 N.Y. 405, 182 N.E. 63 (1932).
140 Misc. 142, 249 N.Y. Supp. 122 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
235 App. Div. 738, 255 N.Y. Supp. 715 (2d Dep't 1932).
259 N.Y. 405, 410, 412, 182 N.E. 63, 65, 66 (1932).
Id. at 412, 182 N.E. at 66.
255 N.Y. 307, 174 N.E. 690 (1931).
Id. at 319, 174 N.E. at 695.
47 STAT. 70, 29 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq. (1932).
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none of the employees, discrimination against employees because of
union membership or activity was not prohibited,27 and injunctions were
issued freely in labor controveries where there was evidence of violence,
breach of the peace or fraud.
II
Although the Norris-LaGuardia Act antedated by approximately one
year the advent of the first Franklin D. Roosevelt administration, it may
fairly be said to be part of that philosophy of government which has
since been lauded and excoriated as the "New Deal." And it is the
New Deal which marks the origin of the modern law of labor relations.
It was during this period that the National Industrial Recovery Act,28
with its famous Section 7(a), was enacted, guaranteeing to workers the
right of self-organization and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. A learned justice -Osaid of it, "In section
7(a) we have reached the rubicon of industrial relations." It was during
the same era that the Wagner ActaO came into being.
During the same period, the legislature of the State of New York
enacted measures designed not only to guard against infringements
of the rights already granted to labor unions by the New York courts,
but also to expand those rights and to create new ones. Thus, in 1935,
it passed Section 876-a of the Civil Practice Act,31 as the state counterpart of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and, in 1937, it passed the New York
State Labor Relations Act,' as the state counterpart of the Wagner
Act, to insure to workers engaged in intrastate commerce the same
rights as those possessed by workers engaged in industries affecting
interstate commerce.
Yet, it is one of the anomalies of our law that these statutes, the purpose of which was to protect and expand the rights of labor unions
and to create new rights for them, have been perverted by the New
York courts into instruments for oppressing them and restricting their
rights.
Section 876-a of the Civil Practice Act was intended to regulate the
use of the injunction in labor disputes. It divested the courts of juris27. Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, et al, 245 N.Y. 260, 264, 157 N.E.
130, 133 (1927); Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, 247 N.Y. 65, 74, 75, 79, 159
N.E. 863, 866, 868 (1928).

28.
Corp.
29.
(Sup.
30.
31.
32.

48 STAT. 195 (1933); declared unconstitutional in A. L. A. Schecter Poultry
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
Farulla v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 153 Misc. 738, 277 N.Y. Supp. 47, 62
Ct. 1934) (J. Black).
49 STAT. 449, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. (1935).
N.Y. Laws of 1935, c. 477, effective April 25, 1935.
N.Y. Laws of 1937, c. 443, effective May 20, 1937; N.Y. LABOR LAW § 700 el seq.
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diction to issue restrictive decrees in cases involving or growing out of
labor disputes, except upon specified conditions. These included a finding of fact that an unlawful act or breach of a contract not contrary to
public policy had been threatened or committed, as a result of which
the complainant's property was being subjected to substantial and irreparable injury. Such finding could be niade only after a hearing upon
notice in which there was full opportunity for confrontation and crossexamination of witnesses. Any temporary. injunction granted was to
be limited to a duration of ten days and any permanent injunction was
to be limited to six months subject to renewal after a further hearing.
The term "labor dispute" was defined in the broadest possible language.
It included "any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms
or conditions of employment, or concerning employment relations, or
any other controversy arising out of the respective interests of employer
and employee, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in
the relation of employer and employee." A case involved or grew
out of a "labor dispute" when it "involves persons who are engaged in
the same industry, trade, craft or occupation, or who are employees of
one employer" and whether the dispute is between employees or unions
and employers or employer associations, between employer associations,
between employees and the unions, or between unions, or when the
case involves any conflicting or competing interests of persons participating or interested in a "labor dispute." In cases "involving or growing
out of a 'labor dispute'" the courts were deprived of power to issue
injunctions, which prohibit, directly or indirectly, any person or persons
from doing, whether singly or in concert, the following, among other,
acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any
relation of employment;
(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization
or of any employer organization, regardless of any agreement, undertaking or promise;
(c) Giving publicity to and obtaining or communicating information
regarding the existence of, or the facts involved in, any dispute, whether
by advertising, speaking, picketing, patrolling any public street or
any place where any person or persons may lawfully be, or by any
other method not involving fraud, violence or breach of the peace;
(d) Ceasing to patronize or employ any person or persons;
(e) Doing in concert any of the aforementioned acts on the ground
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that the persons engaged therein constitute an unlawful combination
or conspiracy or on any other grounds whatsoever.
The Wagner Act and the New York State Labor Relations Act both
guaranteed to employees the right to form, join or assist labor organizations, to engage in concerted activities and to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, free from employer
intervention, restraint or coercion. A labor organization which represented a majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit
became the exclusive bargaining representative of all of the employees
in the unit and the employer was placed under a legal duty to recognize
and negotiate with the majority representative. "Company unions"
were prohibited, the closed shop was declared legal if assented to by
the majority representatives and the employer was prohibited from
discriminating against his workers because of their union affiliation or
activities. Election machinery was provided to determine which labor
organization, if any, a majority of the employees in an appropriate
bargaining unit desired to represent them. Boards of experts were
created to deal with the problems arising under each of the labor relations acts and to enforce their decisions.
During the first few years following the enactment of Section 876-a,
the Wagner Act, and the New York State Labor Relations Act, the
trade union movement in America began to make substantial progress.
It was during this period that the CIO was created. It set itself out to
organize the workers in the mass production industries. But soon,
an intense rivalry developed between the CIO and the AFL. Each
competed with the other to represent the unorganized workers of the
same employer. A number of jurisdictional strikes took place and
new legal problems were created for the courts. Nevertheless, unionization proceeded at a rapid pace. Strikes for higher wages, shorter hours,
and improved working conditions were occurring with greater frequency. New techniques of picketing developed. The whole industrial
picture of America was undergoing a fundamental change. The organized
labor movement was pressing forward toward greater gains. But there
was still an overwhelming number of employers, large and small, who
were resisting unionization of their workers and improvement of their
conditions of labor. In this struggle, the trade unions, on their side,
had the rights granted them in Section 876-a, the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, and the national and state labor relations acts which set forth the
allowable area of economic conffict; the employers, on their side, enlisted the aid of courts of equity to grant them relief notwithstanding
these statutes.
Under the definitions in Section 876-a of "labor dispute" and "cases
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involving or growing out of a labor dispute," the court was obviously
limited to an inquiry into the question of whether the controversy
concerned terms or conditions of employment, or employment relations,
or any other controversy arising out of the respective interests of
employer and employee, regardless of whether or not the disputants
stood in ihe proximate relation of employer and employee. If the
controversy came within the definitions, Section 876-a deprived the
courts of power to issue injunctions except under specified circumstances.
The court did not have the function or responsibility to weigh the
interests of labor, capital and the public, or to approve the wisdom of
the union's objective, no matter how disastrous the social consequences.
That had already been done by the legislature. It had declared the
public policy of the State of New York.
However, the courts found a convenient way of by-passing Section
876-a in cases where they themselves believed that the facts warranted
the issuance of an injunction even though Section 876-a precluded it.
They ignored the will of the legislature by resurrecting the old and
hoary phrase "unlawful labor objective." They reasoned that if the
conduct pursued by a union was in furtherance of a purpose which
they did not understand or which, to them, seemed economically, industrially or socially unsound, or otherwise unjustified, then such conduct was in furtherance of an "unlawful labor objective" and, therefore,
no "labor dispute" could be involved; absent a "labor dispute," Section
876-a offered no protection.
And so it came to pass that, as the New York legislature expanded
organized labor's rights by broadening the concept of "labor dispute,"
so the New York courts responded by contracting organized labor's
rights and eliminating from the definition of "labor dispute" such activities and objectives which they themselves deemed objectionable. This
was but a repetition of what the United States Supreme Court had done
many years earlier in stripping the Clayton Act--"Labor's Magna
Charta"-of all of its vitality.
From this point on, the main questions which the courts of New
York State proceeded to determine first in all picketing cases to come
before them were: "When is a 'labor dispute' a 'labor dispute'?" "When
is a strike a strike?"
The first major test of Section 876-a arose in 1937 in Thompson v.
Boekhout et al. In that case, the plaintiff was the sole owner of a small
motion picture theatre. He had employed one projectionist. Later he
discharged him and took over his duties himself. Thereupon, the defendant union stationed pickets, including the discharged employee, to
33.

273 N.Y. 390, 7 N.E.2d 674 (1937).
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force plaintiff to reemploy the projectionist under a contract prepared
by the union. Special Term granted an injunction and held that a
"labor dispute" within the meaning of Section 876-a was not involved.
The Court of Appeals in a per curiam opinion held:
"Where the owner of a small business seeks to avoid 'labor disputes' as defined in
the statute, by running his business without any employees, an attempt to induce
or coerce him to hire an employee or employees, upon terms and conditions satisfactory to persons associated in such attempted inducement or coercion, is not a
'labor dispute' within the letter or spirit of the statutory definition. '"
Prior to Section 876-a, the courts of New York had consistently enjoined picketing of firms which employed no workers0 4
Although Section 876-a did not expressly require that there be
employment, it did include in the definition of "labor dispute" "any
controversy . . . concerning employment relations ...."
The Court of Appeals, nevertheless, ruled in the Thompson case
that employment was a prerequisite to any "labor dispute."
Decisions in the Federal courts interpreting "labor dispute" under
the Norris-LaGuardia Act have taken a contrary position.
Notwithstanding the decision in Thompson v. Boekhout et al., the
Court of Appeals later in the same year rendered two decisions which
were notable for their liberality.
In the first, Edjomac Amusement Corp. v. Empire State Motion Picture Operators' Union, Inc., decided in April 1937, the defendant
union picketed an employer, who was in contractual relations with a
rival union, for the purpose of peacefully persuading its employees
to join the defendant. Special Term permitted picketing, under these
circumstances, but enjoined the use of signs which read--"An Appeal.
Don't patronize this theatre. It does not employ members of (defendant
union)," unless there was added to it the legend that plaintiff "employs
union labor to operate motion picture machines." On appeal, the complaint was dismissed on the authority of StillweU Theater v. Kaplan0 7
In the second case, decided in December 1937, the Court of Appeals
handed down one of its most notable decisions--Goldfinger v. Feintuch.P
In that case a non-union manufacturer of "kosher" meat products was
paying its butchers wages substantially less than were being paid in
33a. Id. at 393, 7 N.E. 2d at 675.
34. Luft v. Flove, 270 N.Y. 640, 1 N.E. 2d 369 (1936); Yablonowitz v. Korn, 205
App. Div. 440, 199 N.Y. Supp. 769 (1st Dep't 1923).
35. Rohde v. Dighton, 27 F. Supp. 149 (W.D.Mlo. 1939). Cf. Scan v. Tile Layers
Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937).
36. 273 N.Y. 647, 8 N.E.2d 329 (1937).

37. 259 N.Y. 405, 182 N.E. 63 (1932).
38. 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E.2d 910 (1937).
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union plants. The union endeavored to obtain a collective agreement
from him providing for the same labor standards as prevailed in union
plants. Wfien it was unsuccessful, it decided to picket the non-union
made products at the retail stores selling the product. It placed one or
two pickets at the plaintiff's store who carried signs bearing legends
which called the attention of the public to the name of the non-union
manufacturer whose products were being sold in the store and which
requested customers to buy union-made products only. Plaintiff sought
an injunction to restrain the picketing. The Court of Appeals ruled
that a "labor dispute" was involved under Section 876-a and dismissed
the complaint. It stated that "where a retailer is in unity of interest with
the manufacturer, the union may follow the non-union goods and seek
by peaceful picketing to persuade the consuming public to refrain from
purchasing the non-union product, whether that is at the plant of the
manufacturer or at the store of the retailer in the same line of business
and in unity of interest with the manufacturer," even though the storekeeper may be "the sole person required to man his business." 8 '
This decision still stands as the authoritative law0 of New York.
But, as the courts developed an unsympathetic attitude towards many
of organized labor's objectives and activities so they began to limit the
Goldfinger v. Feintuch decision to the precise facts of that case.40
Until the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, the federal courts gave
a much broader interpretation to the term "labor dispute" in the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. They permitted not merely picketing of the
product, but also of the retailer who sold the product.4 '
The next major test of Section 876-a arose in 1939. In Busch Jewelry
Co. Inc. v. United Retail Employees Union, Local 830,1 the Court of
Appeals was confronted with picketing which was accompanied by
38a. Id. at 287, 11 N.E. 2d at 913.
39. People v. Muller et al., 286 N.Y. 281, 36 N.E. 2d 206 (1941).
40. People v. Bellows, 281 N.Y. 67, 22 N.E. 2d 238 (1939); Mayer Bros. v. Meltzer
et al., 274 App. Div. 169, 80 N.Y.S. 2d 874 (1st Dep't 1948); Canepa v. Doe, 251
App. Div. 802, 297 N.Y. Supp. 147 (1st Dep't 1937), aff'd, 277 N.Y. 52, 12 N.E.2d
790 (1938); American Gas Stations, Inc. v. Doe, 250 App. Div. 227, 293 N.Y. Supp.
1019 (2d Dep't 1937); City Entertainment Corp. v. Young, 194 Misc. 367, 85 N.Y.S. 2d
605 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Hawley et al., 176 Misc. 821,
28 N.Y.S.2d 936 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 261 App. Div. 953, 27 N.Y.S.2d 423 (1st Dep't
1941).
41. Bakery Sales Drivers v. Wagshal, 333 U.S. 437 (1948); Milk Wagon Drivers
Union et al. v. Lake Valley Farm Products Inc. et al., 311 U.S. 91 (1940); Taxicab
Drivers Local v. Yellow Cab, 123 F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1941); Wilson & Co. v. Birl
et ai., 27 F. Supp. 915 (D. C. Pa.), aff'd, 105 F. 2d 948 (3d Cir. 1939).
42. 281 N.Y. 150, 22 N.E.2d 320 (1939).
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intense violence. Upon the facts it was clear that injunctive relief was
warranted even under the provisions of Section 876-a.
No defense will here be made of violence as a technique of picketing.
Nor is there any question about the power of state courts, either in the
absence or presence of statute, to enjoin violent and fraudulent conduct.' Although the result reached in the Mcadowmoor case, decided
two years later, has been severely criticized, there can be no quarrel
with Mr. Justice Frankfurter's statement that there is "nothing in the
Fourteenth Amendment that prevents a state if it so chooses from
placing confidence in a chancellor's decree and compels it to rely exclusively on a policeman's club" 44 in situations where police protection
is inadequate. But as the learned justice recognized in that case, "the
right of free speech cannot be denied by drawing from a trivial rough
incident or a moment of animal exuberance the conclusion that otherwise peaceful picketing has the taint of force," a conclusion fortified
by him in a later opinion in Cafeteria Employees Union et al. v. Angelos
et al.,', where he held that the:
"Right to free speech in the future cannot be forfeited because of dissociated acts
of past violence .... Still less can the right to picket itself be taken aray merely

because there may have been isolated incidents of abuse falling far short of
violence occurring in the course of that picketing?'
and where he also declared that:
"... to use loose language or undefined slogans that are part of the conventional
give-and-take in our economic
and political controversies-like 'unfair' or 'fascist'4
is not to falsify facts."'1
The question in the Busch Jewelry case was not whether violence
could be enjoined under Section 876-a, but whether a permanent injunction, issued by the court below, restraining all picketing, including
peaceful picketing, should be sustained. If the court were to follow
Section 876-a meticulously, it would modify the injunction by restraining only the continuance of such acts as were illegal-and then only
for six months-and would permit peaceful picketing to continue in
the meantime. If the court were to ignore Section 876-a, then it would
sustain the injunction upon the finding of the court below that the union
had failed in its responsibility to the public and that any picketing by
it in the future would result in the same kind of disorderly conduct and
unlawful acts as had occurred in the past4 The Court of Appeals chose
43. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
44. Aik Wagon Drivers' Union et al. v. Aleadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 295

(1941).
45.

320 U.S. 293, 296 (1943).

45a. Id. at 295.
46. Nann v. Rainist, 255 N.Y. 307, 174 N.E. 690 (1931); Exchange Bakery &
Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin et al., 245 N.Y. 260, 157 N.E. 130 (1927).
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the latter course and held that, under the circumstances of this case,
Section 876-a did not limit the powers of the court to prohibit all
picketing.
It should be observed that the following year, however, the Court
in May's Furs & Ready-To-Wear, Inc. et al. v. Bauer" applied Section
876-a and permitted peaceful picketing upon the ground that there was
no finding by the court below "and perhaps no basis for a finding that
an injunction against continuance of the wrongful acts which accompanied the violence would be disobeyed or that peaceful picketing is
'out of the question.'"
In that case, the employer of a large retail store and a company union
with which it had entered into a collective relationship sued to enjoin
the defendant, a rival union, which represented none of the employees
in the store, from picketing for recognition. The court said, "Although
the members of the defendant (union) are not the employees of plaintiff
employer, no less is their direct interest in the labor policy of an employer who is engaged in the same industry as they are. It is common
knowledge that the conditions of employment prevailing in a given
establishment cannot be insulated against the influence of different
'4
standards which may exist elsewhere in that industry. 71
In the same year, 1940, in Baillis v. Fuchs,43 the Court of Appeals
reiterated the principle of the Thompson v. Boekhout et al. case that "the
first essential of a 'labor dispute' is employment." However, it disregarded the lack of employment of workers at the time of the action,
and held that a "labor dispute" existed because the strikers were those
who, before the strike, had been in the plaintiff's employ.
A year later in Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber et al.,40 it went the whole
hog in contracting and practically destroying the definition of "labor
dispute." In that case, the plaintiff was engaged in the performance
of grand opera in cities and towns unable to support grand opera
companies. In order to minimize its expenses the plaintiff used recorded music instead of a live orchestra to provide musical accompaniment. The defendant Musicians' Union, seeking employment for its
members, demanded that the plaintiff discard the "canned" music.
When the plaintiff refused to accede, the defendant union induced the
47. 282 N.Y. 331, 26 N.E.2d 279 (1940). See also Strauss et al. v. Steiner et al.,
173 Misc. 521, 18 N.Y.S.2d 395 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 259 App. Div. 725, 18 N.Y.S. 2d
75 (2d Dep't 1940).
47a. May's Furs & Ready to Wear, Inc. et al. v. Bauer, 282 N.Y. 331, 339, 340, 26
N.E.2d 279, 283 (1940).
48. 283 N.Y. 133, 27 N.E.2d 812 (1940).
49. 285 N.Y. 348, 34 N.E.2d 349 (1941).
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Stagehands' Union and the Guild of Musical Artists to order their
members not to work for the plaintiff.
Although the facts clearly brought the situation within the Section
876-a definition of "labor dispute," the court nevertheless held that,
inasmuch as the dispute was not reasonably connected with wages,
hours, health, safety, the right of collective bargaining, or any condition of employment or for the protection from labor abuses," no lawful
labor objective was involved and, hence, Section 876-a did not apply.
In the words of the court, "For a union to insist that machinery be
discarded in order that manual labor may take its place and thus
secure additional opportunity of employment is not a lawful labor obThe court made no attempt to evaluate the connection
jective."49'
between the elimination of recordings and the wages, hours and conditions of employment of union members. Chief Judge Lehman dissented. He took the view that only the legislature "may restrict or enlarge the field within which combinations may lawfully act, the purposes which they may lawfully promote, and even the means which
they may lawfully use; and its actions there may properly be dictated
by its considered opinion of the economic, social or political consequences and the effect upon the public welfare of combinations to
achieve particular ends.... The courts have no such power."""
In the same year, the Court of Appeals reiterated its concept of
"unlawful labor objective." In American Guild of Musical Artists, Inc.,
et al. v. Petrillo et al.,ao it held that a complaint for a permanent injunction stated a cause of action when it alleged that the defendant
Musicians' Union refused to permit its members to render services
at functions participated in by members of plaintiff Guild who were opera
and concert artists unless the instrumentalists and symphony orchestra
leaders resigned from plaintiff Guild and joined defendant Musicians'
Union. The complaint had been attacked on the ground that a "labor
dispute" was involved and the acts sought to be enjoined fell within the
protection of Section 876-a. The court held that in the absence of a
factual showing that defendant's demand was connected with an activity
"having some reasonable connection with wages, hours, health, safety,
the right of collective bargaining or some other condition of employment," the actions of the defendant did not constitute a lawful labor
activity. judge Lehman again dissented and again insisted that the
majority of the court was intruding into a field from which it had been
excluded by Section 876-a.
49a. Id. at 357, 34 N.E. 2d at 353.
49b. Id. at 368, 34 N.E.2d at 358.
50. 286 N.Y. 226, 36 N.E.2d 123 (1941).
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Reference must also be made to the decision which the Appellate
Division, Second Department, rendered in DeNeri v. Gene Louis, Inc.5'
in 1941. The case went up on an agreed statement of facts. Here the
union was the plaintiff. It sued for an injunction to restrain the violation of a collective agreement entered into by defendant, a beautician,
which provided that the defendant would not charge less than certain
stated minimum prices for services rendered to its customers in order
to insure its ability to pay its workers the scales of wages which had
been agreed upon. The defendant employer contended that the agreement was illegal as in restraint of trade under Section 340 of the General
Business Law, that a "labor dispute" existed and that plaintiff union
had not complied with the requirements of Section 876-a of the Civil
Practice Act. The court dismissed the complaint. It held that the
agreement was in restraint of trade but that a "labor dispute" did exist.
But, in Wolchok v. Kovenetsky,5 2 which involved a dispute between
two unions as to which had the right to administer an existing collective
agreement with an employer and the right to the funds and records
of the contracting union, the Appellate Division, First Department,
held that no "labor dispute" existed. However, it denied the injunction on the ground that the affidavits raised issues of fact and
ordered an immediate trial.
Also beginning with 1940, the courts of New York started to interpret
Section 876-a in the light of the provisions contained in the New York
State Labor Relations Act.
In Stalban v. Friedman et al.," the defendant union, which represented none of plaintiff's employees, was picketing plaintiff who had
signed a collective agreement with a rival union which had been certified
by the State Labor Relations Board. The court found that a labor dispute was involved and since plaintiff had failed to comply with Section
876-a he was not entitled to injunctive relief. It said:
"The question is not affected by the fact, if it be a fact, that the State Labor
Relations Board has held that the union whose members are now employed by the
plaintiff is the proper agency for collective bargaining. ' ' 3a'

Two years later, the Court of Appeals decided Florsheim Shoe Store
Co. et al. v. Retail Shoe Salesmen's Union et al., 4 in which the same
problem was involved. The facts showed that two unions were striving
for recognition as the collective bargaining agent of plaintiff's employees.
261 App. Div. 920, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 463 (2d Dep't 1941).
52. 274 App. Div. 282, 83 N.Y.S. 2d 431 (1st Dep't 1948).
53. 259 App. Div. 520, 19 N.Y.S.2d 978 (1st Dep't 1940).
53a. Id. at 521, 19 N.Y.S.2d at 979.
54. 288 N.Y. 188, 42 N.E.2d 480 (1942).
51.
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The defendant union had called a strike for recognition and was picketing plaintiff's stores. Thereafter one of the unions (said to be company
dominated and controlled) instituted representation proceedings before
the State Labor Relations Board and the defendant union intervened in
the proceeding. An election was held in which the petitioning union
was successful. It was certified and immediately entered into a collective agreement with the plaintiff. The defendant, the defeated union,
continued its stike.
Special Term granted plaintiff a temporary injunction against the
picketing. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals had
to contend (a) with its previous decision in the Stillwell Theatre case
in which it had permitted picketing under these circumstances, (b)
with the provisions of Section 876-a which had been enacted since that
time, (c) with the State Labor Relations Act and the Wagner Act
which expressly declared that the rights of employees to strike or engage in other lawful concerted activities should not be interfered with,
impeded or diminished in any way, and (d) with the fact that nothing
in these Acts contained any prohibitions, such as exist in the present
Taft-Hartley Law, against striking or picketing an employer to compel
him to bargain collectively with a union when another has been certified
as the collective bargaining agent of his employees.
The majority of the court held that any clabor dispute" which may
have theretofore existed under Section 876-a terminated with the election and that anything thereafter done by the defeated union fell outside the protective ambit of that section. The court declared that no
other decision would be consonant with the New York State Labor Relations Act, the underlying policy of which was to provide a peaceful
procedure for ending industrial disputes.5 judge Desmond who, together with Chief Judge Lehman and Judge Loughran, dissented,
prefaced his dissenting opinion with a statement which emphasized the
new attitude taken by the majority of the court. "It is no function
of ours," he wrote, "to decide whether defendants' picketing is unfair or
antisocial, or whether attitudes like those taken by defendants tend to
promote and prolong industrial strife and make more difficult the
achievement of industrial peace. Such questions are for other forums."
He wrote further that the State Labor Relations Act "nowhere provides that all industrial strife and dispute are forbidden, once resort
is had to the State Labor Relations Board. On the contrary, it says in
so many words that 'nothing in this article shall be construed so as to
55. A contrary rule prevailed in the federal courts. American Chain & Cable ,v.
Truck Drivers, 68 F. Supp. 54 (D.C.N.J. 1946); Yoerg Brewing Co. v. Brennan,
59 F. Supp. 625 (D. C. Afinn. 1945).
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interfere with, impede or diminish in any way the right of employees
to strike or engage in other lawful, concerted activities.' "15
When the Florsheim case was tried on the merits, the trial court
granted a permanent injunction against all picketing because there had
been evidence of violence, mass picketing and the use of misleading
signs. On appeal, the Appellate Division limited the scope of the injunction to violence and misleading legends."
In Dinny & Robbins, Inc. v. Davis et al.," decided in 1943, the
Court of Appeals went one step further. It denied the existence of a
"labor dispute" in a jurisdictional controversy between two unions,
neither of which had been certified by the New York State Labor Relations Board. In that case, the plaintiff company had bargained collectively with one of the unions and had entered into an agreement with
it. Thereupon, the defendant rival union began to picket plaintiff, with
one person at a time, in retaliation for the picketing which the contracting union had engaged in against employers who had signed
contracts with defendant union. The court concluded that the picketing was to compel the employer to breach the agreement which it had
entered into with the other union and that such purpose was illegal.
It said Section 876-a "does not compel courts of equity to force the
breach of a valid contract .. .made as a result of collective bargaining. . . . On the contrary, the Legislature provided in the State Labor
Relations Act a due and orderly process for settling such jurisdictional
disputes.""8 It held Section 876-a to be inapplicable on the ground that
it "was not designed as an instrument to promote and protect strife
between rival groups or to injure or destroy the good will and business
of innocent employers against whom there was no complaint concerning
wages or working conditions solely because they refused to take sides
with one group as against the other." Hence, it ordered that an injunction issue but permitted picketing with signs which stated the fact
that there was no strike against the employer and that, although none
of the workers were members of defendant union, they were regular
members of another union.
Thereafter and until the Taft-Hartley Law 9 was enacted, New
55a. 288 N.Y. 188, 203, 42 N.E. 2d 480, 487 (1942).
56. 269 App. Div. 850, 54 N.Y.S. 2d 788 (2d Dep't 1945).
57. 290 N.Y. 101, 48 N.E. 2d 280 (1943).
58. Id. at 106, 48 N. E. 2d at 282. It should be noted that the federal rule under the
80 N. L. R. B.
Taft-Hartley Law is less restrictive. In Matter of Perry Norvell Co. et al.,
225 (1948), the National Labor Relations Board held that a union seeking to supplant
a collective bargaining representative which had not been certified may legally picket
for such a purpose.
59. 61 STAT. 136, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq. (1947).
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York courts followed a regular pattern in co-relating Section 876-a
with the State Labor Relations Act.'0 They continued to hold that the
issuance of a labor board certification or the execution of a collective
bargaining agreement terminated any labor dispute within the meaning of Section 876-a, but in most cases they limited injunctions to
prohibiting violence and misleading signs."' However, where a representation proceeding concerning the conflicting claims of rival unions
was pending undetermined, they held that a "labor dispute" existed. Where only one union was involved, the courts found that a "labor
dispute" existed although the union had been defeated in a board-conducted election,63 or the employer's petition had been dismissed on the
union's concession that it did not represent a majority of the employees," or where there had been no board proceeding but the employer had "offered" an election."
Attention must also be called to the fact that despite the fact that
no specific exemption is provided in Section 876-a, the courts have held
that the term "labor dispute" may not be applied to any controversy
arising between a union and the state or any political or civil subdivision or other agency thereof or to employees of charitable, educational or religious associations or corporations except in instances
where the workers are employed in profit making enterprises of such
employer. The excuse for this has been that these employers are
exempt from the operation of the New York State Labor Relations
06
Act.
1I
While the New York courts were thus engaged in groping for solutions to complex and difficult industrial problems, the Supreme Court
of the United States had gone on peregrinations of its own in quest of
60. The summary which follows in this paragraph is from Feldblum, Some Aspects
of Minority Union Picketing in New York, 20 FoRD. L. Rrm'. 176, 183 (1951).
61. Theatre Co. v. Lederfine, 24 LAB. REL. REP. (Ref. Man.) 2273 (1949); Sachs

Quality Furniture, Inc. v. Hensley, 269 App. Div. 264, 55 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Ist Dep't
1945); Lou G. Siegel, Inc. v. Rosenzweig, 85 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. CL. 194S).
62. Oppenheim Collins & Co. v. Carnes, 81 N.Y.S.2d 825 (Sup. CL 1948).
63. Yonkers New System Laundry, Inc. v. Simon, 18 N.Y.S.2d 73 (Sup. Ct.),
modified, 259 App. Div. 912, 20 N.Y.S. 2d 74 (2d Dep't 1940).
64. Steins Wines and Liquors, Inc. v. O'Grady, 75 N.Y.S. 2d 627 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
65. Carl Ahlers, Inc. v. Papa, 272 App. Div. 905, 71 N.Y.S. 2d 423 (Ist Dep't 1947).
66. Jewish Hospital of Brooklyn v. Doe et al., 252 App. Div. 581, 300 N.Y. Supp.
1111 (2d Dep't 1937); Beth-El Hospital et al. v. Robbins, 186 Misc. 506, 60 N.Y.S.2d
798 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Society of New York Hospital v. Hanson et al., 185 Misc. 937,
59 N.Y.S.2d

Dep't 1947).

91

(Sup. Ct. 1945), af'd, 272 App. Div. 998, 73 N.Y.S.2d

835 (1st
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new legal concepts with which to clear the muddy waters of labor
relations.
In 1938, three years after the enactment of the Wagner Act and
eight years after the adoption of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, it refused
an injunction in Lauf et al. v. E. G. Skinner & Co.,0 7 against a union
which was picketing an employer for recognition and for a closed shop
agreement even though none of the workers involved were members of
the union. The Court held that a labor dispute was involved ahd, in the
absence of compliance with the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the issuance
of an injunction by the lower court was in excess of its jurisdiction.
In 1940, in Tkornkill v. Alabama,"" the Supreme Court struck
down an Alabama statute forbidding peaceful picketing, engaged in for
the purpose of dissuading persons from dealing with a disputed firm,
as an unconstitutional restriction of freedom of speech. Mr. Justice
Murphy, writing, for a majority of the Court, declared that industrial
controversies are "matters of public concern," and picketing the only
"practicable method whereby the facts of a labor dispute may be publicized in the vicinity of the place of business of the employer," and that
"abridgment of the liberty of [peaceful and truthful discussion on
matters of public interest] can be justified only where the clear danger
of substantive evils arises under circumstances affording no opportunities to test the merits of ideas by competition for acceptance in the
market of public opinion." '
Later in the same year, in American Federation of Labor et al. v.
Swing et al., the Court held:
"The scope of the Fourteenth Amendment is not confined by the notion of a
particular state regarding the wise limits of an injunction in an industrial dispute,
whether those limits be defined by statute or by the judicial organ of the state."09

In 1942, it had to cope with an injunction which had been sustained
by the New.York Court of Appeals two years earlier in Wohl et al. v.
Bakery and Pastry Drivers' Union et al.70 The union involved had a
dispute with two independent peddlers because of their refusal to hire
an unemployed union member as a relief worker on one day each week.
The union, in order to bring secondary pressure upon them, picketed the
manufacturing bakers from whom the peddlers bought products and
67. 303 U.S. 323 (1938).

See also New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co.,

303 U.S. 552 (1938).

68. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
68a. Id. at 104, 105.
69. 312 U.S. 321, 326 (1941).
70. 284 N.Y. 788, 31 N.E.2d 765 (1940)
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picketed the retail stores to which they sold them. The Supreme Court""
found no difficulty in reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Mr. Justice Jackson, writing for the majority, held:
.. . one need not be in a 'labor dispute' as defined by state law to have a right
under the Fourteenth Amendment to express a grievance in a labor matter by
publication 71unattended by violence, coercion, or conduct otherwise unlawful or
oppressive."1
"A state is not required to tolerate in all places and all circumstances even peace-

ful picketing by an individual. But so far as we can tell [the peddlers] mobility
and their insulation from the public as middlemen made it practically impossible
for [the Union and other plaintiffs] to make known their legitimate grievances
to the public whose patronage was sustaining the peddler system except by the
means here employed and contemplated; and those means are such as to have
"
slight, if any, repercussions upon the interests of strangers to the issue Ilb

Mr. Justice Douglas wrote a separate concurring opinion, some of
by the majority of the
Court 2 as a basis for receding from the position which it had originally
expressed in the Thornhill case. He asserted that "Picketing by an
organized group is more than free speech, since it involves control of
a particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line may
induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature
of the ideas which are being disseminated. Hence those aspects of
picketing make it the subject of restrictive legislation." He went on
the language of which was used in later cases

to say:
".. . since dissemination of information concerning the facts of a 'labor dispute'
isconstitutionally protected, a state is not free to define 'labor dispute' so narrowly
as to accomplish indirectly what itmay not accomplish directly. That seems to me
to be what New York has done here. [Section 76-a], as construed and applied,
in effect eliminates communication of ideas through peaceful picketing in connection with a labor controversy arising out of the business of a certain class of retail
bakers. But the statute is not a regulation of picketing per se--narrowly drawn,
of general application and regulating the use of the streets by all picketeers. In
substance it merely sets apart a particular enterprise and frees it from all picketing.
are to survive, I do not see how New York
If the principles of the Thornhill case
'
can be allowed to draw that line. "

In explaining the Wohl decision, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in Carpenters and Joiners Union of America et al. v. Ritter's Cafe et al., stated
that the businesses picketed there were "directly involved in the dis71.
71a.
71b.
72.
72a.

Bakery and Pastry Drivers' Union et al. v. Wol et al., 315 US. 769 (1942).
Id. at 774.
Id. at 775.
Hughes et al. v. Superior Court of California, 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
See note 71 supra, at 777.
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pute. In picketing the retail establishments, the Union members would
only be following the subject matter of their dispute."13
In the Ritter case, a restaurateur, who employed union help in
his cafe, engaged a contractor to erect a building wholly unconnected
with the business of the cafe at a site one and a half miles from it.
The defendant union, objecting to the contractor's use of non-union
labor, picketed the 'cafe in a truthful and peaceful manner. The Texas
court held that the picketing was an illegal restraint of trade in violation
of the state's anti-trust laws. In sustaining the injunction against all
picketing against Ritter's cafe, Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote:
"... recognition of peaceful picketing as an exercise of free speech does not imply
that the states must be without power to confine the sphere of communication to that
directly related to the dispute. Restriction of picketing to the area of the industry
within which a labor dispute arises leaves open to the disputants other traditional
modes of communication. To deny to the states the power to draw this line is
to write into the Constitution the notion that every instance of peaceful picketing
-anywhere and under any circumstances-is necessarily a phase of the controversy
which provoked the picketing. Such a view of the Due Process Clause would compel
the states to allow the disputants in a particular industrial episode to conscript
neutrals having no relation to either the dispute or the industry in which it arose."178 a

In the Wohl case, the Court found a nexus between the subject
matter of the dispute and the establishments which were being picketed.
In the Ritter case, the Court found absent any close interdependence of
economic interests between picketing Ritter's cafe and the labor dispute
against a building contractor who was erecting another building for
him wholly unconnected with the cafe a mile and a half away.
But courts all over the country went far beyond the decisions in
the Wohl and Ritter cases and held that picketing, to be constitutionally
protected, had to be conducted for lawful objectives. They took the
position that the Thornhill case held merely that blanket legislation
banning all picketing was unconstitutional and not that all picketing
was constitutionally protected.7 4 Injunctions were invariably issued
against (a) picketing to compel the violation of a statute; and (b)
picketing to compel the acceptance of practices which the judges themselves deemed improper or undesirable. The courts believed that they
were as fully qualified as the legislature to separate the worthwhile and
legitimate labor objectives from the anti-social and undesirable ones,
and undertook to do so.
Sooner or later, these questions were bound to reach the Supreme
Court of the United States.
315 U.S. 722, 727 (1942).
73a. Id. at 727, 728.
74. Saveall v. Demers, 322 Mass. 70, 76 N.E. 2d
Council, 179 Ore. 1, 169 P.2d 870 (1946).
73.

12

(1947); Peters v. Central Labor
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By 1947, the economic and industrial situation in the United States
had changed materially. Our country had but recently emerged victoriously from the Second World War. During that war, wages and
prices had been placed under governmental control. However, wages
remained more stable than prices. Unions had voluntarily given a nostrike pledge and practically all of them observed it. When the controls
were released, unions sought to obtain from employers, throughout
the country, increases in wages to meet the increases which had taken
place in the cost of living and to improve conditions of employment
further. When these were refused, a wave of strikes broke out. The
political situation had likewise changed. For the first time since 1930,
the Republican Party had regained control of both Houses of Congress.
It was in this atmosphere that the 80th Congress enacted the TaftHartley Law,7i one of the most controversial pieces of legislation of
modem times. The new law modified the Wagner Act substantially. It
undertook to regulate the entire field of labor-management relations
in industries affecting interstate commerce. Among other things, it
added a series of unfair practices of labor organizations to the existing unfair practices of employers. New problems immediately arose
which required immediate resolution. Whether Mr. Dooley's famous
quip that the "Supreme Court follows the election returns" is right or
not, the fact remains that the provisions of the. Taft-Hartley Law had
tremendous impact upon the courts and their attitudes in picketing
cases changed perceptibly. The Supreme Court of the United States
and the courts of the State of New York were not immune.
The first important case to reach the Supreme Court after TaftHartley, was Giboney et al. v. Empire Storage and Ice Company,71 decided on April 4, 1949. In that case, the defendant union, which included ice peddlers, started a drive to improve the wages and other
working conditions of its members. In this effort, the union sought to
organize the non-union peddlers. Because of lack of progress in this
direction, it requested every wholesale ice distributor in Kansas City to
stop selling ice to non-union peddlers. The plaintiff refused. The union
threw a picket line around its plant. Most of the truckdrivers servicing
plaintiff were union men and they honored the picket line. Plaintiff
sought an injunction restraining picketing by the defendant union on
the ground that any agreement made by the plaintiff not to sell ice
to non-union peddlers would be in restraint of trade and a felony under
the Missouri anti-trust law and, that, therefore, the union's efforts to
75. 61 STAT. 136, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq. (1947).
76. 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
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compel plaintiff to make such an agreement was for an unlawful purpose. The Missouri Supreme Court, in approving the injunction granted
by the court below, affirmed the finding that the picketing had been
undertaken for the purpose of coercing the plaintiff to perform acts in
restraint of trade and that under the Missouri statute such activities
were unlawful. Only intrastate commerce was involved.
Mr. Justice Black, writing for a unanimous Court, brushed aside the
union's contention that its primary purpose in picketing was to improve wages and working conditions by winning new members. He
upheld the injunction on the -ground that the sole immediate object of
the picketing was not an attempt to publicize the facts of a labor
dispute, but part of an integrated unlawful course of action to compel
plaintiff to agree to stop selling ice to non-union peddlers, in violation
of Missouri law-a law which was not directed at a "slight public
inconvenience or annoyance." He held that the purpose of that law
was to afford all persons an equal opportunity to buy goods and that
the union's conduct created a "clear danger, imminent and immediate,
that unless restrained" would enable the union and its allies to "succeed in making that policy a dead letter insofar as purchases by nonunion men were concerned." He ruled that there is no constitutional
right, in picketing cases, to take advantage of speech or press to violate
valid laws designed to protect important interests of society and for the
benefit of the whole public. Finally, the Court said the basic issue is
whether Missouri or a labor union has paramount constitutional power
to regulate and govern the manner in which certain trade practices
shall be carried on in Missouri. "Missouri has by statute regulated
trade one way. The (union) members have adopted a program to
regulate it another way. The state has provided for enforcement of
its statutory rule by imposing civil and criminal sanctions. The union
has provided for enforcement of its rule by sanctions against union
members who cross picket lines.'" 7 a The Court held, without passing
upon the wisdom of the Missouri statute, that "the state's power to
govern in this field is paramount, and that nothing in the constitutional
guaranties of speech or press compels a state to apply or not to apply its
anti-trade-restraint law to groups of workers, business men or others."'"O
Obviously, the union's primary purpsoe was to further its selfinterests and not a desire to violate the anti-trust law of Missouri; the
picketing was peaceful and the legends on the placards which were
carried were truthful. But the Court refused to separate the picketing
conduct into illegal and legal parts. It reaffirmed an earlier holding
76a.

Id. at 504.

76b.

Ibid.
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that "It is too late in the day to assert against statutes which forbid
combinations of competing companies that a particular combination
was induced by good intentions."77
Some thirteen months later, the Supreme Court of the United States
handed down three important decisions on the same day in cases involving picketing and the right of free speech.
The first was Hughes et al. v. Superior Court of California.," In that
case, an association of individuals interested in defending the rights of
negroes, demanded of the proprietor of a small grocery store whose
customers were equally divided among whites and negroes, that he hire
negro clerks, as white clerks quit or were transferred, until the proportion of negro clerks to white clerks approximated the proportion of
negro to white customers. Upon refusal of this demand, and in order
to compel compliance, pickets were placed about the store carrying
placards stating that the owner "Won't Hire Negro Clerks in Proportion to Negro Trade-Don't Patronize." The owner sued and was
granted an injunction which was sustained by the highest Court of
California. The Supreme Court affirmed. Mr. Justice Frankfurter
wrote the prevailing opinion. He declared:
"Picketing is not beyond the control of a State if the manner in which picketing
is conducted or the purpose which it seeks to effectuate gives ground for its disallowance. ....,,7,.
"The policy of a State may rely for the common good on the free play of con-

flicting interests and leave conduct unregulated. Contrariwise, a State may deem
it wiser policy to regulate. Regulation may take the form of legislation, e.g., restraint of trade statutes, or be left to the ad hoc judicial process, e.g., common
law mode of dealing with restraints of trade. Either method may outlaw an end
not in the public interest or merely address itself to the obvious means towards
such end. The form the regulation should take' ' and its scope are surel; matters
of policy and, as such, within a State's choice. 7Sb

The Court ruled that the fact that California's policy was expressed
by the judicial organ of the state rather than by the legislature was
immaterial. "It is not for this Court to deny to California that choice
from among all 'the various weapons in the armory of the law." The
decision was undoubtedly influenced by policy considerations against
arbitrary discrimination in hiring based "not on fitness for work nor
on an equal right of all, regardless of race, to compete in an open
market, but, rather, on membership in a particular race." Mr. Justice
Black and Mr. Justice Minton concurred on the ground that the case
was controlled by the principles announced in the Giboney case.
77.
78.
78a.
78b.

International Harvester Co. v. Mlissouri, 234 U.S. 199, 209 (1914).
339 U.S. 460 (1950).
Id. at 465, 466.
Id. at 468.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

The second case, decided the same day, was InternationalBrotherhood
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Union et al. v.
Hanke et al.7 9 In that case, Hanke and his three sons, as co-partners,
were engaged in the business of repairing automobiles, dispensing gasoline and automobile accessories and selling used automobiles on a used
car lot. They had no employees. Their predecessor in interest had been
a member of the defendant union which permitted membership of
persons employed or engaged in the gasoline service station business.
Upon purchase of the business, the Hankes continued to display, in
their show window, the union shop card of their predecessor. In the
meantime, the union had negotiated an agreement with an association
of automobile dealers, to which the Hankes did not belong, having a
membership of 115 used car dealers, all of whom except 10 were selfemployers with no employees. The agreement provided that used car
lots be closed by 6:00 P.M. on week days and all day on Saturdays,
Sundays and eight specified holidays. It was the practice of the Hankes
to remain open nights, week-ends and holidays. As a result, the business
and profits of the Hankes improved, while the business of their competitors diminished and the earnings of their salesmen, who were members of the union and who worked on commission, suffered substantially.
The Hankes were requested by the union to abide by the limitation
on business hours or give up their union shop card. They chose to
surrender their card. Thereafter, one or two pickets peacefully picketed
their place of business. The trial court granted a permanent injunction
against all picketing and awarded a money judgment of $250.00 against
the union for damages sustained. The Supreme Court of the State of
Washington affirmed. So did the Supreme Court of the United States.
Again, Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote the opinion of the Court. He
noted the "interplay" present in the case of "competing social-economic
interests and viewpoints." He recognized that "unions obviously are
concerned not to have union standards undermined by non-union
shops" and that "this interest penetrates into self-employer shops."
He held that a state, presented with such serious problems, had the right
to determine for itself "whether to prefer the union or the self-employer
in such a situation, or to seek partial recognition of both interests, and,
if so, by what means to secure such accommodation." He noted that
the state court had determined that" '.. . the conclusion seems irresistible that the union's interest in the welfare of
a mere handful of members (of whose working conditions no complaint at all is
made) is far outweighed by the interests of individual proprietors and the people
of the community as a whole, to the end that little businessmen and property
79.

339 U.S. 470 (1950).
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owners shall be free from dictation as to business policy by an outside group having
but a relatively small and indirect interest in such policy.' ,,70a

As a result, it is now established that it is within the power of a
state, in determining the permissibility of restrictions on picketing in
a particular case, to weigh such community interests as free communications, effective unions, and the welfare of small businessmen, without
running afoul of the Constitution.
The third case, which was decided on the same day, and bearing most
importantly on the subject under discission, was Building Service Employees International Union v. Gazzam.80 In that case, the employer
was engaged in intrastate commerce as the proprietor of a small hotel
employing abuot fifteen persons. None of them was a member of any
union. Representatives of the respondent called upon the proprietor
and asked him to sign a contract which would require his employees to
join the union. He replied that that was a matter for the employees to
decide; that signing such a agreement would put him in the position
of coercing his employees to join a union, that it was contrary to the
law of the state for him to do so. However, he gave the representatives
of the union permission freely to visit and solicit his employees for
membership while he was absent from the city on a brief trip. Upon
his return, he arranged, at the union's request, a meeting of his employees at which the union representatives could come and present
their case. Six labor representatives attended this meeting as did eleven
of the properietor's employees. The union representatives were afforded
a full opportunity to persuade the employees to join the union. At the
conclusion of the meeting, a vote was taken. The overwhelming majority
of employees voted against joining the union. Thereupon, the proprietor
was put on the union's "We Do Not Patronize" list and pickets began
walking in front of his hotel bearing a sign reading "Unfair To Organized Labor." The picketing was carried on by a single picket at a
time and was intermittent and at all times peaceful.
The State of Washington has a statute declaring its public policy
on the subject of organization of workers for bargaining phrposes.
Under that public policy, workers are free to join or not to join a union
and are to be free from the coercion, interference or restraint of employers of labor in the designation of their representatives for collective
bargaining. Also, the State of Washington has an anti-injunction act in
which the definitions of "labor dispute" and "cases arising or growing
out of a labor dispute" are substantially identical with Section 876-a
of the New York Civil Practice Act.
79a. Id. at 477, 478.
80. 339 U.S. 532 (1950).
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Mr. Justice Minton wrote for the Court. He held that the Giboney
decision controlled the disposition of this case and that, therefore, the
injunction which had been issued and the judgment for damages which
had been awarded by the Washington court must be approved. He
found that "under the enunciated public policy" of the State of Washington, "picketing of an employer to compel him to coerce his employees'
choice of a bargaining representative," i.e., picketing by a minority or
stranger union for recognition, "is an attempt to induce a transgression
of this policy" though no criminal sanctions attached thereto. He declared, "To judge the wisdom of such policy is not for us; ours is but
to determine whether a restraint of picketing in reliance on the policy
is an unwarranted encroachment upon rights protected from state
abridgement by the Fourteenth Amendment." He held that there was
"no unwarranted restraint of picketing" present in this case. "The
decree was limited to the wrong being perpetrated, namely, 'an abusive
exercise of the right to picket.'" He pointed out that the injunction
issued by the state court did not enjoin picketing per se but only that
picketing which had as its purpose violation of the policy of the state
and that the state statute had not been construed by the state court
to prohibit picketing of workers by other workers but only prohibited
coercion of workers by employers. He added, "There is no contention
that picketing directed at employees for organization purposes would
be violative of that policy. The decree does not have that effect." The
applicability of the definition of "labor dispute" in the state statute was
not discussed. Mr. Justice Black contented himself by announcing
his concurrence solely on the ground that the case was controlled by
the principles announced in Giboney et al. v. Empire Storage & Ice
Company.8 0
Thus, the decisions of the Supreme Court in picketing cases have
undergone substantial changes in the past thirteen years. The starting
point, of course, was the Thornhill case in which the Court identified
picketing with free speech and afforded constitutional protection in
all picketing cases save those in which there was present a "clear and
present danger" of a substantive evil. In the Swing case, it extended
the constitutional protection to stranger picketing. From that point
on, the Court started to alter its views. In the Meadowmoor case, it
left to state regulation picketing by violence and "acts of picketing in
themselves peaceful when they are enmeshed with contemporaneously
violent conduct which is concededly outlawed." In the Wohl and Ritter
cases, it adopted a "reasonable basis" test; when it found a "close interdependence of economic interest" it allowed picketing; when it did not,
80a.

See note 76 supra.
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it enjoined picketing. In later cases, it abandoned this test and adopted
the "unlawful objective" test as the basis upon which to deny constitutional protection. In the Giboney and Gazzam cases, it held that
where the state found it to be an "unlawful objective" to picket for a
purpose not consonant with public policy, as declared by state legislation, it would deny to such picketing the healing benediction of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. In the Hughes case, it held that
where the state declared it to be an "unlawful objective" to picket for
a purpose not consonant with the public policy of the state, as judicially
formulated, it would likewise deny constitutional protection to such
picketing. In the Hanke case, it declared that where the state found
it to be an "unlawful objective" to picket where such picketing contravened the "communities best interests," it would not substitute its
judgment for that of the state court in order to grant constitutional
immunity to such picketing. Of course, the Swing, Ritter, Giboney,
Hughes, Hanke and Gazzam cases all involved intrastate commerce. In
later cases,"' decided under the "secondary boycott provisions" of the
Taft-Hartley Law, it decided that where Congress declared it to be an
"unlawful objective" to picket in situations defined in Section 8(b) (4)
of the Taft-Hartley Law, it would follow a similar rule.
V
The changing views of the Supreme Court of the United States in
picketing situations were bound to have their effect upon the New York
courts.
Five weeks after the decision in the Gazzam case, the Appellate Division, First Department, decided Haber & Fink, Inc. v. "Jones," etc. 2 It
affirmed an injunction against all picketing by a union which lost a
representation election in which it was the sole contender for certifica3
tion.8
Less than a year later, there again arose the problem of reconciling
the alleged conflict of policies between Section 876-a and the State
81. N.L.R.B. v. International Rice Milling Co. et al., 341 U.S. 665; N.L.R.B.
v. Denver Bldg. & Construction Trades Council et al., 341 U.S. 675; International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers et al. v. N.L.R.B., 341 U.S. 694; Local 74, United
Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners et al. v. N.L.R.B., 341 U.S. 707; all cases decided on June 4, 1951.
82. 277 App. Div. 176, 98 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1st Dep't 1950).
83. Under federal law, "A labor organization may lose an election in which it was

the only union on the ballot and the next day call a legal strike to recognize it as
the bargaining agent for those employees who have just rejected it." See RIrorrr or Tm
JoiNT Coinnn
ov LABOR
A N1AA5E Nr RELATIONS, Sn,. REP. 986, pt. 3, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1948).
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Labor Relations Act. In S. S. Pennock Co. v. Ferretti,4 representation
proceedings were terminated without an election by a disclaimer filed
by the defendant union. Subsequently, the union commenced to picket
the plaintiff employer, ostensibly for the purpose of organizing its
workers. During all of this time a rival union also made demands upon
the employer for recognition. In these circumstances, the employer
sued to enjoin the picketing and for damages.
The court held that the picketing was part of a plan to avoid a labor
board election, thus depriving the workers of the right to select bargaining representatives of their own choice. Pushing the doctrine of Haber
& Fink, Inc. v. "Jones," etc. one step further, the court concluded that
such an objective was unlawful and granted the injunction against all
picketing and awarded damages.
This, then, was the legal setting when, in 1951, Goodwins, Inc., et al.
v. Hagedorn et al. 5 came before the Court of Appeals. In that case the
complaint had been dismissed by Special Term for lack of jurisdiction,
after a full hearing. The Court of Appeals predicated its opinion upon
the assumption that the allegations of the complaint and the evidence
offered by the plaintiff in support thereof were true. The plaintiff's
evidence was to the effect that it was engaged in interstate commerce;
that two unions, one of which was defendant, claimed to represent
the plaintiff's employees; that the rival union had commenced a representation proceeding before the National Labor Relations Board, in
which the defendant had intervened; that both the rival union and defendant union had filed unfair practice charges against the plaintiff
with the Board; that while these charges were being processed no
election could be scheduled; that approximately six months after the
initiation of the National Labor Relations Board proceeding, the defendant union made a demand upon the plaintiff employer for an exclusive bargaining contract which was refused by the plaintiff on the
ground that it would be committing an illegal act; that upon such refusal the defendant union started picketing the plaintiff's premises "with
the avowed object of forcing the plaintiff employer forthwith to recognize
the defendant union as sole collective bargaining agent despite the competing claims of a rival labor organization to represent the same employees."
Chief Judge Loughran, speaking for the majority of a sharply divided
court, which disclaimed any attempt to pass upon the true reasons for
the picketing but merely assumed the truth of plaintiff's evidence, held
"The picketing in question is unlawful under the law of this State."
84.
85.

201 Misc. 563, 105 N.Y.S.2d 889 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
303 N.Y. 300, 101 N.E.2d 697 (1951).
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After quoting from the State Constitution, the State Labor Relations
Act and the Taft-Hartley Law, he concluded that:
"In the face of the above legislation there is no denying that it would be unlawful
for the plaintiff employers to yield to a demand that they recognize the defendant

union instead of some rival labor organization as the exclusive collective bargaining
agent for the employees of the plaintiff employers in advance of certificatiof by
the National Labor Relations Board in the pending representation proceeding ...
Section 876-a of the New York Civil Practice Act does not bar injunctive relief

in a case
where, as here, no lawful labor objective is sought by the defendant
85
union.))

He closed his opinion with the following:
"Our conclusion is that the acts of the defendant union here complained of by
the plaintiff employers, if established by proof (1) would constitute an actionable
tort under the law of this State entitling the employer to injunctive relief; (2) are

not within the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act; and (3) are not
such concerted union activity as is protected thereby. Even so, in the absence of
any findings establishing the right of the plaintiff employers to the relief sought in
the complaint, a new trial must be ordered. Hence we remit the case for a decision

on the merits."' s b

This decision makes no distinction between situations involving intrastate commerce only and those affecting interstate commerce and, apparently, applies the same rule to both. It has provoked a mass of
lower court rulings which seem to go far beyond that intended by the
Court of Appeals and which have raised a variety of new questions
which are far from settled.
Since, under both federal80 and state 87 law, a representation proceeding may be initiated by an employer or by a union or by rival unions,
one of the effects of the Goodwins decision has been to outlaw the
recognition strike, during the pendency of any representation proceeding irrespective of who initiates it, a purpose which Congress expressly
rejected when it enacted the Taft-Hartley Law,88 except in the case
where another union was certified. The decision in the Goodwinss6 case,
after it was later tried on the merits, furnishes an apt illustration of
some of the confusion which exists in the present state of the law.
85a. Id. at 305, 101 N.E. 2d at 699.
85b.

Id. at 307, 308, 101 N.E. 2d at 700, 701.

86. 61 STAT. 143, 29 U.S.C. A. § 159 (c) (1) (B) (1947).
87. Matter of Kappel, 13 S.L.R.B. 611 (1950).
88. SmN. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1947):
"It is to be observed that the primary strike for recognition (without a Board certification)
is not proscribed";
H. R. Co. . R-,. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1947):
"It is to be observed that the primary strike for recognition (without a Board certification)
was not prohibited."
89. 30 LAB. REL. RyP. (Ref. Man.) 2057 (1952).
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Starting with the premise that the Court of Appeals had outlawed
"picketing for recognition, by an uncertified union, while rival claims
are pending,"-a principle which the Court of Appeals had limited to
cases where a representationproceeding involving rival unions is pending, the trial justice announced the dictum "that a fairly respectable
case can be made out that the decision stands for the proposition that
all minority picketing for recognition, even in the absence of rival claims,
is likewise unlawful and enjoinable." He then proceeded to the defendant's contention that it sought merely a "members only" contract,
a form of recognition long recognized as valid by the National Labor
Relations Board, even when granted during the pendency of a representation proceeding involving rival unions. Holding that a representation
proceeding must necessarily result in a certification of one of the
unions as the exclusive bargaining agent, or none at all, he believed that
the filing of a petition for representation contradicted the union's contention that it was seeking "a members only" contract. He obviously
failed to grasp the distinction between the end sought by a union in
a representation proceeding (certification as exclusive bargaining agent)
and its demand for recognition (prior to certification) for the sole
purpose of making a contract for only such members as it represented.
In any event, he held that the defendant union had not established
that it represented any employees of plaintiff-although the record
contained proof to the contrary-and that "whether the picketing was
for members only representation or for exclusive or sole representation,
the rule of law is the same, on the basis of the reading by this Court of
the opinion of the Court of Appeals."9' 0
90. In this respect, the trial judge's views are at complete variance with the decisions
theretofore rendered by the National Labor Relations Board. The holdings of the
Court of Appeals and the trial judge stem from the determination of the National Labor
Relations Board in the Matter of Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 NS.L.R.B. 1060
(1945), that the recognition by an employer of one of several rival unions as exclusive
bargaining agent during the pendency of a representation proceeding constitutes an
unfair labor practice. But the Midwest Piping doctrine has recently been subject to
much limitation and modification. In Matter of The Hoover Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1614,
1618 (1950), the Board held:
"Under the doctrine of the Midwest Piping case the employer's exclusive recognition of
one of the two rival unions violates the Act only if at the time such recognition Is
granted the question concerning representation raised by the rival petition still Is pending. However, before recognition is granted many things might occur which would
remove that question and would render exclusive recognition of a majority representative
perfectly lawful: Thus, for example, the rival union might withdraw its petition, or
the Board, for any number of reasons, might dismiss it. Again, the employer faced
with rival demands may, without violating the Midwest Piping doctrine, grant recognition
to each of the claimants on a members-only basis."
This principle was reaffirmed by the Board in Matter of Electronics Equipment Co.,
94 N.L.R.B. 62 (1951). See the most recent pronouncement of the Board in Matter
of Spitzer Motor Sales, 102 N.L.R.B. No. 39 (Jan. 21, 1953).
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He granted a permanent omnibus injunction of such scope that the
union has been forbidden to publicize its controversy with the plaintiff
either by mail, in the public press, through advertisements, or on the
radio, or to solicit membership in the union at the employees' entrances
to the storeY' Although he discussed the distinction between recognition
picketing and organizational picketing and concluded that the ruling
of the Court of Appeals did not and should not "in the interests of good
labor relations" bar organizational picketing, nevertheless, he refused
to make this distinction in the final decree, even though requested by
defendants to do so.
The New York lower courts have gone much further, however, than
the decision of the Court of Appeals in the Goodwins case warrants
and many of their decisions are in conflict with each other.
Generally speaking, the decided cases fall within the following categories:
1. Recognition picketing by a union against an employer who has
entered into a collective agreement with a rival union which has been
certified by either the State or National Labor Relations Board. The
courts, since the Goodwins case, have enjoined all picketing under these
circumstancesY
2. Recognition picketing by a union after it has been rejected in
an election, conducted by either the State or National Labor Relations
Board, of its employees who voted in favor of "No Union" representing them. The courts have been uniform in granting injunctions against
such picketing but are divided upon the question of permitting picketing with signs bearing truthful legends, i.e., publicity picketing. 3
3. Recognition picketing by a union against an employer where
91. An interesting and illuminating sidelight on the practical effect of this injunction
may be observed from the events which preceded and followed its issuance; the unfair
labor practices filed by both unions were unilaterally settled by the N.L.R.B. with
the employer; later, when an election was on the verge of being ordered, the rival

union, which had initiated the representation proceeding withdrew its petition; thereupon,
the defendant union's intervention fell also. As the matter now stands the defendant
is subject to a permanent restraint even though no rival unions are involved and ro
representation proceeding is pending and even though the doctrine established by the
Court of Appeals no longer has any application to the case.
92. Jones v. Levine, 127 N.Y.L.J. 529, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 7, 1952). Contra:
Florsheim Shoe Store Co. et al. v. Retail Shoe Salesmen's Union et al., 269 App. Div.
850, 54 N.Y. S. 2d 788 (2d Dep't 1945).
93. Accord, LaMana v. O'Grady et al, 278 App. Div. 77, 103 N.Y.S. 2d 476 (1st
Dep't 1950); Saperstein et al. v. Rich et al., 114 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1952). See
Markowitz v. Retail Food and Grocery Clerks' Union et al., 111 N.Y.S. 2d 885 (Sup.
Ct. 1952). Contra: Haber and Fink, Inc. v. "Jones" etc., 277 App. Div. 176, 93 N.Y. S. 2d
393 (1st Dep't 1950).
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representation proceedings, instituted by a union and which may or
may not involve rival unions, are pending before either the State or
National Labor Relations Board. The courts have been uniform in enjoining recognition picketing but 4 are divided on the question of permitting organizational picketingY
4. Recognition picketing by a union against an employer who thereupon files a representationproceeding with either the State or National
Labor Relations Board. The courts have held that the pendency of the
employer's representation proceeding is sufficient to enjoin all picketingY5

5. Recognition picketing by a union which has instituted a representation proceeding which is still pending before either the State or National Labor Relations Board and where an election has already been
held in which the picketing union received a majority vote, but where it
has not yet 'been certified because of the long delays involved in the
Board's processing of objections, filed by the employer and a rival union,
to the conduct of the election and the results thereof. The courts, since
the Goodwins case, have enjoined all picketing in this kind of a situa96
tion.
94. Accord, Lotmar Corp. v. Norton et al., 117 N.Y.S. 2d 607 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
Contra: Goodwins, Inc. et at. v. Hagedorn et al., 30 LAB. REL. RET. (Ref. Man.) 2057
(1952); Mayer v. Doe, 128 N.Y.L.J. 832, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 16, 1952).

See also

Shenker Displays Inc. v. Stankowitz, 127 N.Y.L.J. 1384, col 5 (Sup. Ct. Apr. 7,
1952). In Strauss Stores Corp. v. District 65, 129 N.Y.L.J. 437, col. I (Sup. Ct. Feb.
6, 1953), the court enjoined picketing even before it started, upon the theory that
"the situation should remain in status quo until the (representation) proceedings before
the administrative agencies are completed." The temporary injunction was made
permanent by Official Referee Steinbrink, in a somewhat lengthy opinion In 129
N.Y.L.J. 661, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 27, 1953). The opinion of the official referee brings
the case squarely within Goodwins Inc. et al. v. Hagedorn et al.
95. Sheey's West Side Restaurant, Inc. v. Townsend, 112 N.Y.S. 2d 200 (Sup. Ct.
1952); Rose Embroidery Corp. v. Freedman, 128 N.Y.L. 3. 1330, col. 1 (Sup. Ct.
Dec. 1, 1952), affd,--App. Div-(March 3, 1953).
This appears to be a very convenient way for an employer to resist -unionization of
his plant. In the first place, he immediately obtains an injunction to stop all picketing.
In the second place, since it takes time for the Board to process a representation case,
i.e., to determine the appropriate unit (a question which may be disputed and therefore require a hearing) and thereafter determine the eligibility of voters and give
adequate notice of the election, he can maneuver delays and gain time to undermine
the morale of his workers and to discourage their joining or continuing their affiliation
with the union. Thus, obtaining an injunction, the employer effectively "uses" the court
as an instrumentality for preventing union organization.
96. Union News Co. v. Davis et a., 201 Misc. 1062, 108 N.Y. S. 2d 554 (Sup. Ct.
1951). Inasmuch as an employer may, in any case, file objections, even where only a
single -union is involved, and, in this fashion delay certification, the labor relations
acts, which were enacted for the purpose of facilitating collective bargaining, have been
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6. Recognition picketing by a union which has instituted a representation proceedingwhich is still pending before either the State or National
Labor Relations Board and where no election has as yet been held but
where the proof, after trial, or the affidavits in opposition to a motion
for a temporary injunction show that the union actually represents a
majorityY
Selton Service, Inc. v. Dioguardi et al." shows the extreme to which
Goodwins Inc. et al. v. Hagedorn et al. has been pushed by the lower
courts. In that case, the defendant union demanded that plaintiffs
recognize it as the collective bargaining agent. Upon the refusal of the
plaintiffs to accede to this request, the union initiated a series of intermittent strikes and picketing demonstrations. While these strikes were
in progress, the union filed a petition for representation with the National Labor Relations Board. Because of the opposition of the plaintiff
employer, no election had been held at the time of trial.
The evidence established that a majority of plaintiffs' employees
had authorized the union to bargain for it. No other union was involved. Nevertheless, the court held, "that any effort to bring economic
pressure, such as through picketing or striking, to compel an employer
to require his employees to be represented by a union in advance of
certification by the National Labor Relations Board, was unlawful and
that such unlawfulness was subject to injunction." This, in the face
of an express declaration by Congress "that the primary strike for
recognition (without a Board certification) is not proscribed" by the
Taft-Hartley Law. This, in the face of an express indication by the
court that the union represented a majority of the employees. This, in
the face of a holding by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals s that it
is an unfair labor practice under the Taft-Hartley Law for an employer
perverted into an instrumentality for the prevention of collective bargaining. Contra:
Mele Mfg. Co. v. Doe, 125 N.Y.L.J. 1530, coL 3 (Sup. Ct. Apr. 26, 19S1), decided
prior to the Goodwins case.
96a. A variation from this category may be found in situations where an election
under the auspices of either the State or National Labor Relations Board has been held,
but the results thereof are inconclusive and must await the processing of challenged
ballots by the Board. Such a situation was present in Alter v. Jones, 129 N.Y.L.J. 721l
col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Mfar. 4, 1953). However, the picketing which occurred in that case
was not for exclusive recognition but to compel the employer to reinstate four (4)
workers who had previously been on strike and who were promised reinstatement by
the employer before the consent election agreement was executed. The court denied
injunctive relief upon the ground that the pendency of the representation proceeding
dd not negate the existence of a labor dispute under Section 876-a.
97. 116 N.Y.S.2d 36 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
98. N.L.R.B. v. American Thread Co., 31 LAB. Rix. REP. (Ref. Mlan.) 2053,
198 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. den.,--U.S.-(Feb. 2, 1953).
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to refuse to recognize and to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representative of a majority of his employees even in the absence of a
certification by the National Labor Relations Board.
0 Special Term reached
Interestingly enough, in Klein v. Freedman,"
a conclusion diametrically opposed to that in Selton Service, Inc. v.
Dioguardi et al. In the Klein case, the court found that, inasmuch as
the union represented a majority of the employer's workers, the demand
of the union for recognition followed by peaceful picketing, during the
pendency of a representation proceeding, was not unlawful.
7. Recognition picketing by a union which has instituted a representation proceeding which is still pending before either the State or
NationalLabor Relations Board, and the Board, without an election, determines at a preliminary hearing, at which all of the employees testified,
that the employees do not desire the union as their bargaining agent.
The court has enjoined all picketing.100
8. Recognition picketing by a union which has instituted a representation proceeding which is pending before either the State or National
Labor Relations Board but where neither Board has processed the petition because of lack of policy as to whether the state or national Board
has jurisdiction over the industry involved. The court has enjoined
recognition picketing but permitted organizational and publicity picket101
ing.
9. Recognition picketing by a union against an employer who instituted a representationproceeding which was dismissed by the National
Labor Relations Board because the officers of the union have failed or
refused to file non-communist affidavits as required by the Taft-Hartley
Law. The court has held that Section 876-a of the Civil Practice Act
was inapplicable and granted an injunction against all picketing." 2
10. Organizational or publicity picketing by a union which dis99. 129 N.Y.L.J. 8, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 2, 1953). But.in Amorosi v. Sager, 200
Misc. 315, 106 N.Y.S.2d 121 (Sup. Ct. 1951), decided before the Goodwins case, the

court refused to consider, on a motion for a temporary injunction, affidavits of the
plaintiff's employees

that they wished to remain non-union.

The court wrote "The

employees' affidavits do not have the same force as a secret election undei the statute."
100. Sheey's West Side Restaurant, Inc. v. Townsend, 112 N.Y.S. 2d 200 (Sup.
Ct. 1952).
101. Bon-Flo Taxi Corp. v. Norton, 128 N.Y.L.J. 1060, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Nov.

5, 1952). The court said, inter alia, "While sympathetic with the union in its predicament
and its endeavor to combat the abuses alleged to exist in the industry, the Court Is

constrained to follow the precedents heretofore recited and enjoin picketing that has for
its purpose the compulsion of recognition while proceedings are pending before the
State Labor Relations Board. The remedy for the situation lies with the appropriate
legislative body."
102. Bickford's, Inc. v. Mesevich,

107 N.Y.S.2d 369

(Sup.

Ct. 1951).
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claimed majority status, and by reason of whose disclaimer a representation proceeding instituted by an employer before either the State or
National Labor Relations Board had been dismissed. The court, in
one case, after trial refused to enjoin the picketing.10 3 In another case,
the court, upon affidavits on a motion for a temporary injunction,
enjoined all picketing on the ground that the "union had made no
serious effort to organize the plaintiff's employees" and that the primary
objective of the picketing "was not to organize plaintiff's employees,
but to disorganize the plaintiff under economic pressure, to the end that
the plaintiff would recognize or cause recognition to be given to the
defendant union."'1 4 In still another case, °3 the court, on affidavits,
held that where the union does not claim to represent a majority, but
is engaged in publicity picketing with signs stating plaintiff is "unfair
to and does not employ" members of defendant union and "help us
gain better conditions in the . . .industry," picketing may not be enjoined whether or not a labor dispute exists.10" The court distinguished
the Goodwins case by showing that three essential elements present
there were absent here. In this case (a) there were no representation
proceedings pending, (b) there were no rival unions involved, (c) there
was no avowed purpose of forcing recognition of defendant union as
collective bargaining agent despite competing claims of a rival union.
It distinguished the Pennock case by showing that there was absent
here any finding that the picketing was part of a plan to avoid an election
to choose a bargaining representative.
11. Recognition picketing by a union against an employer where
no representation proceeding ever had been instituted with either the
State or National Labor Relations Board, but where a consent election
was conducted by the New York State Mediation Board which resulted
in a tie vote and no run-off election ever had been held. The court
enjoined all picketing."0 7 Although the union contended that the
vote taken was not binding since the Labor Relations Board had exclusive jurisdiction to determine the appropriate bargaining unit and to
conduct the election and that in any event the union was only engaged
in organizational picketing the court held, on affidavits submitted on
103. Larson Buick Co. v. U.A.W. et al., 113 N.Y.S. 2d 90S (Sup. CL 1952).
104. Metropolis Country Club, Inc. v. Lewis et al., 114 N.Y.S.2d 620 (Sup. Ct.),
af'd, 280 App. Div. 816, 113 N.Y.S.2d 923 (2d Dep't 1952).
105. Wykagyl Country Club v. Lewis et a/.,109 N.Y.S.2d 594, 596 (Sup. Ct.

1951).
106. Citing May's Furs and Ready-To-Wear, Inc. et al. v. Bauer, 282 N.Y. 331,
340, 26 N.E.2d 279, 283 (1940); Silver Dollar Bake Shop v. WeLssman, 27 N.Y.S.2d
744 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
107. Chic Maid Hat Mfg. Co. v. Korba (Sup. CL Sept. 12, 1952) (unreported).
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the motion for a temporary injunction and without a hearing, that
"the picketing . . . (was) directed entirely toward compelling the
plaintiff to enter into a contract with the defendant union as the sole
collective bargaining agent of the employees of the plaintiff, although
it has not been established that the defendant union represents a majority of such employees."
12. Recognition picketing, where no representationproceedings ever
had been instituted 'before either the State or National Labor Relations
Board by a union against an employer who had previously entered into
a collective agreement with a rival uncertified union. In earlier decisions,
the courts permitted picketing with truthful signs. The most recent
decisions have enjoined all picketing.'
13. Recognition or organizational picketing, in the absence of any
pending representation proceeding before either the State or National
Labor Relations Board where no contract with a rival union exists,
and where no determination has been made that the union does not represent a majority of the employees. The courts, upon affidavits, have
dismissed the complaint for failure to comply with Section 876-a and
denied injunctive relief. 0 9
14. Where a representation proceeding is pending but the union
contends that it is engaged merely in organizationalpicketing, or where
no representation proceedings are pending and the employer contends
the union is picketing for an unlawful purpose.
In Rose Embroidery Corp. v. Freedman,"' the plaintiff's papers on
the application for a temporary injunction asserted that the union was
picketing the plaintiff to compel it to coerce its employees to join the
union while a representation proceeding, instituted by the employer,
was pending before the National Labor Relations Board. The defendant's affidavit asserted that the union was merely engaged in organizational picketing. The court, unable to determine on affidavits which
party was entitled to prevail, granted the injunction on the theory that
greater harm would result to plaintiff from a denial of the injunction
than would result to defendant from issuance of it. This is, indeed,
far cry from the hitherto well established principle that the provi108. Brookshire's Inc. v. Werner, 128 N.Y.L.J. 872, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 20,
1952); Feldshuh v. Bergman, 127 N.Y.L.J. 2421, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. June 18, 1952);
Gluckstern's Restaurant, Inc. v. Tepper, 127 N.Y.L.J. 2363, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Juno
13, 1952); Bobolia v. Teamsters Union, 126 N.Y.L.J. 528, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 18,

195i).
109. Wood v. O'Grady, 127 N.Y.L.J. 1682, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Apr. 28, 1952); Vezza
v. Paluda, 127 N.Y.L.J. 1617, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. April 23, 1952).
110. 128 N.Y.L.J. 1330, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 1, 1952), aff'd, App. Div. (March 3, 1953).
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sional remedy of injunction pendente lite is an extraordinary remedy
to be granted only when a clear right thereto has been established.
So also in Schumacher & Sons, Inc. v. Horowitz.," the plaintiff
employer contended that the union was picketing for the purpose of compelling the employer to enter into a closed shop agreement. This the
court declared to be violative of the public policy of the United States
under the Taft-Hartley Law (which, concededly, it is) and of the State
of New York (which it is not).112 The union categorically denied the
claim of the employer and contended that it was picketing for organizational purposes. The court, unable to resolve the question of fact from
the affidavits, ordered a hearing before an official referee. Then, apparently on the theory that when in doubt grant the injunction, the
court enjoined the picketing pending the official referee's report.
15. Where no representation proceeding is pending but the union
is engaged in picketing in retaliation for conduct of the employer denominated as an unfair labor practice act in the Taft-Hartley Law.
In Tarrytown Road Restaurant, Inc. v. Hotel, Restaurant & Beverage Dispensers Union, Local 178 et al.," 3 there were no representation
proceedings pending before either the State or National Labor Relations
Board. The plaintiff alleged that the union was engaged in recognition
picketing. The union claimed that it was picketing because plaintiff discharged certain workers as a result of their union activities in connection with which the union had filed unfair labor practice charges with
the National Labor Relations Board. In reply, plaintiff asserted that
the discharged workers were in fact members of the union and that
they provoked their discharge so as to create a feigned labor dispute
in order to justify the picketing, and that the picketing was an act of
reprisal and retaliation against plaintiff because it refused to recognize
the defendant union, notwithstanding it did not and could not claim to
represent a majority of plaintiff's employees. The court had signed an
ex parte order granting a preliminary injunction. After the hearing of
the motion, the court granted an injunction pendente lite, for all purposes, except peaceful, reasonable and truthful picketing in behalf of
the claim of the discharged employees for reinstatement. It enjoined
recognition picketing upon the ground that the Goodwins case stood
for the proposition that "where a union pickets with the objective of
111. 114 N.Y.S.2d 886 (Sup. Ct. 1952). See also S-M News Co. v. Simons, 279
App. Div. 364, 110 N.Y.S.2d 174 (1st Dep't 1952), also 114 N.Y.S.2d 462 (Sup.
Ct. 1952) after trial.
112. Williams v. Quill, 277 N.Y. 1, 12 N.E.2d 547 (1938).
113. 115 N.Y.S.2d 626 (Sup. Ct. 1952). Cf. Cdstaro et at. v. Simons et ai., 302
N.Y. 318, 98 N.E.2d 454 (1951).
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forcing an employer to recognize it as the bargaining agent and the
representative of employees who have not chosen a bargaining agent,
the provisions of 876-a are not applicable." This is clearly an unwarranted extension of the rule established by the Court of Appeals
in a case where rival unions were involved, where representation proceedings were pending, and where one of the unions was picketing with
the avowed purpose of forcing the employer to recognize it as the
exclusive bargaining agent.
Thus, it is abundantly clear that the New York courts have fully
abandoned their traditional policy of allowing picketing in labor disputes as a means of enhancing the interests of labor, except in cases
made unlawful by statute, and have fully accepted the doctrine of
"illegality of objective" a "convenient device whereby a judge might
outlaw union conduct which was contrary to his own economic and social
philosophy."'1 4 It is equally clear that Section 876-a of the Civil Practice Act has been shorn of all practical significance since it is now applicable only to situations in -which the courts deem the purpose of
union activity to be for a "lawful labor objective"-situations in which
no injunction would issue, because constitutionally protected, even if
Section 876-a had never been enacted.
Although not involving any problem of picketing during the pendency
of representation proceedings, two recent decisions of the Court of
Appeals should be noted at this point.
In American President Lines et al. v. King et al.," 6 the plaintiff employer was in collective agreement with a rival of defendant union. The
defendant picketed plaintiff for the alleged purpose of peacefully recruiting and organizing the members of the rival union. The lower
court found that in fact such picketing was in retaliation for economic
action taken by the rival union against the defendant union. Accordingly, when it reached the Court of Appeals the injunction was affirmed.
Judge Desmond, who dissented, pointed out it was not the function of
the courts to make ad hoc declarations of economic policy.
In Nash v. Mennan et al.," 6 the Court of Appeals affirmed, without
opinion, a decision rendered by the Appellate Division, Second Department. In that case, plaintiff employed members of a union with which
it had entered into a collective 'agreement. The wage scales were substantially lower than in the collective agreements made by the defendant
union with other employers. The defendant never attempted to become
the bargaining agent for plaintiff's workers and, indeed, was not in114.
115.
116.

Matter of American News Co. et al., 55 N.L.R.B.
304 N.Y. 708, 107 N.E. 2d 654 (1952).
303 N.Y. 956, 106 N.E.2d 51 (1952).

1302, 1319 (1944).
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terested in doing so. It did attempt, however, to obtain from plaintiff
an agreement that work in erecting commercial fences, over which defendant had jurisdiction and in connection with which plaintiff's competitors employed members of defendant union, be given to members
of defendant union. When this was refused, defendant union informed
the general contractor that, if plaintiff's employees engaged in fence
erection on the job, members of defendant union engaged in other iron
work on the job might walk off. There was also some evidence of a
threat of strike if plaintiff's employees were allowed to proceed with
fence erection which had already been commenced by plaintiff pursuant
to a contract. No strike or picketing actually occurred. The Appellate
Division" 7 had held that a labor dispute existed within the meaning
of Section 876-a. Citing May's Furs and Ready-To-Wear, Inc. et al. v.
Bauer,"8 the court determined that"Although the members of the defendant union are not employees of the plaintiff
defendants had, nevertheless, a direct interest in the labor policies of plaintiff,
who was engaged in the same industry as were the members of the defendant union,
and whose wage scale was lower than that of the defendant union, for the work of
erecting fences. All engaged in a trade are affected by the prevailing rate of
wages.... The dispute involved, although jurisdictional in nature, concerned terms
and conditions of employment which directly affected the interests of the members
...

of the defendant union. ..

.

Citing National ProtectiveAssociation v. Cumming et al.110 as authority, the court further held that:
"The members of defendant union had the right to refuse to work on any ground
which they might consider sufficient, and to act individually, or, as an organization,
if they had no unlawful object in view...
Under the circumstances disclosed by
this record, it was not unlawful for the members of defendant union to refuse

to work on jobs upon which plaintiff's employees were erecting fences, or for defendants to threaten to call a strike of such members, if such conditions should
continue" -uOa

Despite the numerous ad hoc declarations of policy made by the
courts of this state as to the applicability of Section 876-a to labor
controversies--declarations which have often been in conflict with
each other-there are numerous questions which still remain unresolved
and must await decision by the appellate courts. These include, among
others, the following:
1. The applicability of Goodwins, Inc. et al. v. Hagedorn et al.""b
to a situation
117. 279 App. Div. 609, 107 N.Y.S.2d 645 (2d Dep't 1951).
118. 282 N.Y. 331, 26 N.E.2d 279 (1940).
lSa. See note 117 supra, at 609, 610, 107 N.Y. S.2d at 647.
119. 170 N.Y. 315, 63 N.E. 369 (1902).
119a. See note 117 supra, at 610, 107 N.Y.S.2d at 647.
119b. 199 Misc. 518, 106 N.Y.S.2d 865 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
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(a) which involves only one union and in which a representation proceeding, instituted by the union or the employer, is pending;
(b) which involves only one union and in which no representation proceeding is pending;
(c) which involves rival unions and in which no representation
proceeding is pending;
(d) which involves only one union and in which no representation proceeding can be brought because of the failure of the union to
120
comply with the filing requirements of the Taft-Hartley Law;
(e) which involves rival unions and in which no representation
proceeding can be brought because of the failure of the rival unions
to comply with the filing requirements of the Taft-Hartley Law.
2. May the court itself assume the function of determining major
ity or minority status (a function over which the Labor Boards have
exclusive jurisdiction), whether or not a representation proceeding is
pending?
3. If so, may the court, as a necessary corollary, determine the preliminary underlying question of appropriate bargaining unit (also a
function over which the Labor Boards have exclusive jurisdiction)?
4. If so, may the court determine the majority status, if established,
(a) by a check of authorization cards? or
(b) by union records which show that a majority of the employers workers actually have been and are paying dues to the union? or
(c) by an Honest Ballot Association or other unofficial election? or
(d) by affidavits of the workers showing that they are members
of and desire to be members of the union? or
(e) by direct testimony of the workers? or
(f) by a Labor Board election which is not followed by immediate certification?
5. May the court adopt the procedural safeguards of the National
and State Labor Relations Boards of refusing to disclose to the employer or a rival union the names of workers who signed authorization
cards or affidavits or who are dues paying members of the union, in
order to avoid possible recriminations against such workers? If so,
what becomes of the right of confrontation and cross-examination
of witnesses?
6. If majority status in the appropriate bargaining unit may be
determined by the court and is found to exist, will the court permit
recognition picketing, in the absence of Board certification,
120.

61 STAT. 143, 29 U.S.C.A.

§ 159 (1951).
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(a) if rival unions are involved and a representation proceeding is pending?
(b) if only one union is involved and a representation proceeding is pending?
(c) if rival unions are involved and no representation proceeding is pending?
(d) if only one union is involved and no representation proceeding is pending?
(e) if rival unions are involved and no representation proceeding can be brought because of the failure of the unions to comply with
the filing requirements of the Taft-Hartey Law?
(f) if only one union is involved and no representation proceeding can be brought because of the failure of that union to comply with
the filing requirements of the Taft-Hartley Law?
7. May a union, in the absence of certification of a rival union, ever
be enjoined from peaceful picketing for a "members only" contract,
(a) whether or not it represents a majority of the workers in the appropriate bargaining unit and (b) whether or not representation proceedings are pending before either the state or national Labor Relations
Board?
8. What interpretation shall be accorded to the provisions of the
Taft-Hartley Law and the New York State Labor Relations Act safeguarding the right to strike?
9. May peaceful organizational picketing ever be enjoined? What
protection must be given to organizational picketing under Section
876-a and under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal
Constitution? What juridical formula shall be applied to distinguish
organizational from recognition picketing?
10. May the court, on an application for a temporary injunction,
determine on affidavits the question of whether or not a "labor dispute"
within the meaning of Section 876-a exists and the objective for which
the strike or picketing is conducted, or must the court hold a hearing
to determine these questions?
11. If a hearing is required, may the court issue a preliminary injunction pending the hearing?
12. What is the status of stranger picketing? Does it continue to
have constitutional protection and under what circumstances?
VI
But, by far the most important question still to be resolved is whether
state courts have the authority to concern themselves with the objectives of any peaceful strike or of peaceful picketing against an em-
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ployer in interstate commerce or whether Congress by enactment of
the Taft-Hartley Law has, under the federal supremacy clause of the
United States Constitution, preempted the field and closed the door
to any state action, legislative or judicial.
Although the decision in Goodwins went far beyond the issue of jurisdiction, that was the sole question presented to the court. The sharply
divided majority required two separate bases to sustain state jurisdiction. Whether either basis will stand can be decided only by the
Supreme Court of the United States when the requisite fact situations
are presented to it. Prior determinations of the Supreme Court lead
to the belief that it will sustain neither basis and that it will hold that
state courts have been divested of power. If that should come to pass,
New York and all other state courts, when confronted with a prayer
for injunctive relief in a labor controversy, would be limited exclusively
to adjudicating cases involving intrastate commerce and to all cases,
whether involving intra or interstate commerce, where the techniques
employed include violence, breach of the peace, fraud or their equivalent.
All other cases would become subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of
the National Labor Relations Board, and of the federal courts as provided in the Taft-Hartley Law.
In the Goodwins case, the union attacked the jurisdiction of the
court to grant the relief sought upon the ground that, under Article 1,
Section 8, of the Federal Constitution, Congress, in enacting the TaftHartley Law, had exercised its full power to regulate commerce among
the several states, and had, with specified exceptions, placed the administration and enforcement of that Act in the hands of the National
Labor Relations Board and the federal courts; that under Article 6
of the Federal Constitution such law became "the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding"; and that by reason thereof Congress had preempted the field
of labor relations affecting commerce among the several states thereby
depriving state courts of jurisdiction to pass thereon. Special Term
sustained the defendant's plea to the jurisdiction l2 l and dismissed the
action without passing on the merits. The Appellate Division affirmed,12
two of the justices dissenting.
The Court of Appeals reversed by a divided court. 122' Although the
majority of four judges were of the opinion that the state courts were
possessed of jurisdiction over the case, they divided evenly as to the
121. 199 Misc. 518, 106 N.Y.S.2d 865 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
122. 278 App. Div. 936, 105 N.Y.S. 2d 857 (1st Dep't 1951).
122a. 303 N.Y. 300, 101 N.E.2d 697 (1951).
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reason therefor. Chief Judge Loughran, with whom Judge Lewis concurred, predicated state jurisdiction upon the fact that "the picketing
in which the union was engaged was not expressly denominated an
unfair union labor practice in the Taft-Hartley Law and that such
picketing was not a protected concerted activity under Section 7 of
that law inasmuch as its purpose was to coerce the employer into committing an act which is denounced as an employer unfair labor practice
under subdivision (a) of section 8 of the act." Judge Froessel, with
whom Judge Conway concurred, predicated jurisdiction upon the fact
that the Taft-Hartley Law was silent on stranger picketing as an
unfair labor practice, and therefore the state was free to act. He stated,
"In my view the Taft-Hartley Act does not deprive the Supreme Court
of this State of jurisdiction of the subject matter, which is 'governable
by the state or it is entirely ungoverned.' ,,1'
The dissenting judges likewise rendered two opinions. Judge Dye:
with whom Judge Desmond concurred, held that Congress, by its enactment of the Taft-Hartley Law, had preempted the field of labor
relations affecting interstate commerce where the picketing was peaceful
and orderly and not fraudulent nor misleading. Answering Judge Froessel's contention, Judge Dye examined into the legislative history of
the Act to show that Congress had considered and rejected an express
proviso making stranger picketing an unlawful concerted activity subject to injunction in the federal courts at the behest of an employer.
"Silence," he said, "under such circumstances is not tantamount to
creating an exception in a field otherwise preempted by Congress."'
Judge Fuld, with whom the other dissenting judges concurred, based
his dissent upon the fact that the picketing complained of, even though
not the precise conduct designated as an unfair labor practice, was so
closely related to it as to be within "that 'peripheral area.., into which
the states may not intrude without federal authorization."' Inasmuch
as Congress had manifested a design to formulate a uniform policy in
the field of labor relations and had comprehensively regulated the field
"there is no place for the application of state law or policy or for the
exercise of state jurisdiction even though the precise activity complained of may not be covered by Congressional provision."',
The conflict between federal and state jurisdiction and the question of
preemption is not unique to labor relations. It has arisen, under the
federal supremacy provision 12 4 of the United States Constitution in
123.
123a.
123b.
124.

Id. at 308, 101 N.E.2d at 701.
Id. at 309, 101 N.E.2d at 701.
Id. at 310, 101 N.E.2d at 702.
U.S. CONST. Art. VI
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the numerous areas where dual sovereignty may be exercised. Thus, the
issue of conflicting jurisdiction has been the subject of litigation in
rate cases,"a in food and drug cases, 2 ' in the transportation from
127
one state to another of livestock affected with communicable diseases,
in limitation of railroad liability, 1 8 in navigation inspection matters, 1'2 0
in civil rights matters, 130 and in a host of other situations. As a matter
of fact, the issue is now arising in connection with the problems stemming from the control of subversion,' 3 ' a field clearly within the police
power of the state and hitherto thought to be immune from preemption
in the absence of express exclusion of state jurisdiction.
The accommodations inherent in our federal system have created many
problems in federal-state jurisdiction. Where nation-wide uniformity
of regulation is not imperative, even though the activities involved affect
interstate commerce, the Commerce Clause, standing alone does not bar
state regulation. However, where Congress clearly manifests its intention
to preclude state action because nation-wide regulation of the activities
involved is imperative, the constitutional grant of power to regulate
interstate commerce coupled with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution effectively shuts the door to concurrent state regulation. As
stated by Mr. Justice Holmes, "When Congress has taken the particular
subject-matter in hand coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and
a State Law is not to be declared a help because it goes further than
Congress has seen fit to go."' 32 Where Congress, while undertaking to
regulate a field which the states had previously been free to regulate,
is silent with respect to the survival of state regulatory powers, "It long
has been the rule that exclusion of state action may be implied from the
nature of the legislation and the subject matter although express declaration of such result is wanting." 3 3 The will of Congress "is to be discovered as well by what the legislature has not declared, as by what
they have expressed." 34 Where Congress has preempted the field, the
states are powerless to act concurrently, even though the national
125.

Missouri et al. v. Kansas Natural

Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924); Simpson

et al. v. Shepard, 230 U.S. 352 (1913).
126.
127.

Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912).
Mintz et al. v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933);

Reid v. Colorado,

187 U.S.

137 (1902).
128. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Porter et al, 273 U.S. 341 (1927).
129. Kelly et al. v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937).
130. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877).
131. Note, State Control of Subversion: A Problem of Federalism, 66 HARv. L. Ray.
327 (1952).
132. Charleston and W. C. Ry. Co. v. Varnville Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915).
133. Bethlehem Steel Co. et al. v. N.Y.S.L.R.B., 330 U.S. 767, 772 (1947).
134. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 20 (U.S. 1820).
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legislation involved is deemed defective because "important provisions
have been omitted, or that others which might have been made might
have been more extended, or more wisely devised.""'
In the original Wagner Act, Congress dealt only with certain aspects
of labor relations affecting interstate commerce. It "left outside the
scope" of its regulation "other closely related matters," such as employee or union conduct. 136 "Congress has not seen fit to lay down even
the most general of guides to construction of the Act, as it sometimes
does, by saying that its regulation either shall or shall not exclude
state action." 3 7
But the Taft-Hartley Law supplied what was missing in the Wagner
Act. The latter dealt only with the problems of protecting the rights
of employees to organize and to engage in concerted activities for mutual
aid or protection, in connection with which it established a series of
unfair employer practices. The former is a comprehensive code which
governs the entire field of labor-management relations in industries
affecting interstate commerce.
The very preamble to the Taft-Hartley Law declares that it is the
"purpose and policy of this chapter, . . . to prescribe the legitimate
rights of both employees and employers in their relations affecting
commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the
interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other, to protect
the rights of individual employees in their relations with labor organizations whose activities affect commerce, to define and proscribe practices
on the part of labor and management which affect commerce and are
of the public
inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the rights
38
in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce."
Moreover, the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Law shows that
Congress concerned itself with and investigated the entire field of labormanagement relations, from one end to the other; it considered innumerable proposals reaching virtually every practice and problem which had
arisen in the field. It held extensive committee hearings and debates.
Finally, Congress arrived at the approach which it considered most
sound and workable. Adopting some proposals, modifying others, and
rejecting more, it finally formulated its own definition of the rights,
duties, liabilities and immunities which should exist, and selected, in
135. Ibid.
136. Bethlehem Steel Co. et al. v. N.Y.S.L.R.B., 330 U.S. 767, 773 (1947).

In

this connection see Allen-Bradley Local 111 et a!. v. W.E.R.B. et a., 315 U.S. 740 (1942).

Cf. Hill et al. v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
137. Bethlehem Steel Co. et al., v. N.Y.S.L.R.B., 330 U.S. 767, 771 (1947).
138. 61 STAT. 136, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 (b) (1947).
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each instance, what it considered to be the appropriate remedies and
forums for their vindication.3 9
It would require much time and space to list all of the regulatory
proposals which Congress rejected as undesirable. Attention, however,
may be called to some of them, contained in the Hartley Bill which
passed the House, but which were rejected by the Senate and by the
Congress as a whole. The Hartley Bill made it an unfair labor practice
for employees to engage in a strike unless the objective was within a
limited category defined in the Bill as proper. 14 0 It made it an unfair
labor practice for minorities to strike by requiring a majority strike
vote as a condition precedent to the calling of any strike. It defined a
long list of "unlawful concerted activities" in which were included:
(1) "picketing an employer's premises for the purpose of leading persons
to believe that there exists a labor dispute involving such employer
in any case in which the employees are not involved in a labor dispute
with their employer"; (2) any strike designed to compel an employer
to recognize a union not certified by the Board; (3) any strike designed
to remedy an unfair labor practice; and (4) any strike designed to
compel an employer to violate any law, regulation or order issued pursuant to law. It provided that persons injured by any of these unlawful
acts could sue for damages and injunctive relief in the Federal courts,
and that persons found to have engaged in such activity should be
deprived of rights under the Act.
The Taft-Hartley Law rejected all of these proposals. Instead of
defining permissible strike objectives and outlawing all others, the Act
set forth the labor objectives which Congress deemed unlawful and
declared it to be an unfair labor practice for a union to strike or to
induce or encourage a strike for any of these objects. It denied to
private parties, and vested only in the Board, power to obtain injunctive
relief against such practices. Instead of prohibiting strikes designed to
remedy unfair labor practices, as did the House Bill, the Act continues
to protect such strikes. Instead of flatly prohibiting minority strikes
and stranger picketing, the Act illegalizes such conduct only if its object
is to compel an employer to recognize a union other than the one
certified as exclusive bargaining agent of his employees, or to induce
a secondary boycott. Instead of outlawing strikes designed to compel
an employer to violate any other obligation imposed by law, the Act
treats such strikes as unprotected concerted activities, leaving the
employer free to use economic weapons to cope with them. The same
139. Ratner, Problems of Federal-State Jurisdiction in
ComERENCE oN LABoR 77 et seq. (1950).
Fnr-m A imi
140. H.R. REP. No. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
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approach was used to insure compliance with the provisions of the Act
which require the giving of notice before a strike may be called upon
termination of a contract.'" In addition, Congress authorized the Board
to continue to determine whether particular types of concerted activities
were entitled to protection under the Act by applying the normal tests
of justification employed by the Board and the federal courts when
reviewing. 14'
Moreover, Congress, when it enacted the Taft-Hartley Law, demonstrated that it "knew full well that its labor legislation 'preempts the
field that the Act covers insofar as commerce within the meaning of the
Act is concerned.' "14
Because it intended to preempt the field, Congress took care to reserve to the states in clear-cut terms "those areas in which it desired
state regulation to be operative." 1 It decided, after extensive debate,' 45 that46states should be free to prohibit union security agreements
altogether.
Congress also knew that if it required dispute notices to be filed
only with a federal conciliator, the effect would be to bar state conciliation and mediation services from the field entirely.147 To avoid this
result, it provided for notices to be served on state as well as federal
officials, and set forth the respective roles which federal and state officials
are to play in the area of conciliation and mediation.4 8
It made provision for state participation in the effectuation and administration of the national labor policy, to the extent that it considered
such participation desirable. It authorized the National Board to cede
jurisdiction to state agencies over limited classes of local industry, but
only if the state law was consistent with the federal law.14 0
It conferred upon any person injured, "in his business or property,"
by stated types of conduct made unlawful, the right to recover damages
141. See note 139 supra, at 88.
142. See In the Matter of Harnishfeger Corp. et al., 9 N.L.R.B. 676, 636 (1938),
quoted with approval in International Union et al. v. W.E.R.B., 336 U.S. 245,
255-6 (1949); American News Co. et'al., 55 N.L.R.B. 1302, 1312 (1944).
143. Amalgamated Ass'n et al. v. W.E.R.B, 340 U.S. 383, 398 (1951); H.R. RE.
No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1947).
144. Amalgamated Ass'n et al. v. W.E.R.B., 340 U.S. 383, 398 (1951).
145. 93 CoxG. REc. 3453-4, 6519-20, 6532 (1947).
146. 61 STAT. 151, 29 U.S.C.A. § 164 (b) (1947).

147. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, S0th Cong,
1st Sess. 563 (1947).
148. 61 STAT. 153, 29 U.S.C.A. § 172(c)(1947); 61 STAT. 154, 29 U.S.C.A.
(b)(1947); 61 STAT. 140, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d)(3)(1947).
149. 62 STAT. 991, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(a)(1948).
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therefor and vested concurrent jurisdiction over such suits in the federal
and state courts.C °
It deliberately omitted other items in the labor relations field from
the area of federal regulation. It excluded from its definition of "employer," under the Act, any "state or political subdivision thereof," and
hospitals operated not for profit. From the definition of "employee," it
excluded agricultural and domestic labor, independent contractors and
supervisors.
It provided expressly that no employer should be compelled to consider persons defined as supervisors to be employees under any law,
local or national, relating to collective bargaining.15 '
Thus the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Law provides the
clearest evidence that Congress not only intended to preempt the field
of labor management relations but was thoroughly aware of the sweep
and limitations of the preemption doctrine.
Under this doctrine, the propriety of state court relief does not turn
on whether the claim is predicated upon state law or upon the National
Labor Relations Act. The test is whether the transaction involved is
in the "field" covered by the National Act. If so, the rights to which
it gives rise flow exclusively from federal law; substantive rights as well
as remedies flowing from state authority are superseded.'5 2
The question of preemption has been passed upon by the Supreme
Court of the United States in nine separate cases. Four of these cases'
involved the effect of the Wagner Act on state jurisdiction; five'5 4 involved the effect of the Taft-Hartley Law. Of the four cases which dealt
with the Wagner Act, in only one, Allen Bradley Local 111 et al. v.
W.E.R.B. et al., did the Court conclude that the door to state action had
not been closed. There the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board
had found, after a hearing, that the union was guilty of violence, assault
and mass picketing. An order was entered by the Board against the
union. In sustaining the Board's jurisdiction, Mr. Justice Douglas
150.

61 STAT. 140, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(4)(1947).

151.

61 STAT. 151, 29 U.S.C.A.

§ 164(a)(1947).

152. See note 139 supra. Plankinton Packing Co. et al. v. W.E.R.B., 338 U.S. 953
(1950); Direct Transit Lines v. Teamsters' Union, 29 LAB. REL. REP. (Ref. Man.) 2492
(D. C. Mich. 1952); Pocahontas Terminal Corp. v. Portland Bldg. Trades Council et al.,
93 F. Supp. 217 (D.C. Me. 1950).
153. Allen Bradley Local 111 et al. v. W.E.R.B. et al., 315 U.S. 740 (1942); I-11
et al. v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945); Bethlehem Steel Co. et al. v. N.Y.S.L.R.B.,
330 U.S. 767 (1947); Lacrosse Tel. Co. v. W.E.R.B. et al., 336 U.S. 18 (1949).
154. Amalgamated Ass'n et al. v. W.E.R.B., 340 U.S. 383 (1951); International
Union et al. v. O'Brien et al., 339 U.S. 454 (1950); Plankinton Packing Co. et al. v.
W.E.R.B. et al., 338 U.S. 953 (1950); Algoma Plywood v. W.E.R.B., 336 U.S.
301 (1949); International Union et al. v. W.E.R.B. et al., 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
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pointed out that what was there involved was a matter so traditionally
local as public order and safety. The mere passage of the Wagner Act,
he held, was ineffective to impair "the traditional sovereignty of the
several States in that regard." In the other three cases, the first of
which involved a Florida statute requiring all business agents and
representatives of unions to be licensed by the state, and the second of
which involved an order of the New York State Labor Relations Board
under which it had undertaken to certify bargaining agents for units
of supervisors, and the third of which involved an order of certification
issued by the Wisconsin Relations Board, the Court held that Congress
had preempted the field and had divested the state of jurisdiction over
these matters in industries affecting interstate commerce.
The first cases to be decided by the Supreme Court after the passage
of the Taft-Hartley Law involved its provisions as well as those of the
Wagner Act. In Algoma Plywood v. W.E.R.B., the Court dealt with
the validity of a union security provision. Inasmuch as Congress in
Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Law had expressly conferred concurrent jurisdiction upon the states and federal government over union
security provisions, the Court held that Wisconsin was not prevented
from determining its own policy in a field wherein jurisdiction e.xpressly
had been granted to it.
In International Union v. W.E.R.B., the Court again sustained state
action. It clarified its own thinking and restated its rule on the question
of preemption. Methods and policing in picketing cases were left to
the states. "While the Federal Board," said the Court, "is empowered
to forbid a strike, when and because its purpose is one that the Federal
Act made illegal, it has been given no power to forbid one because its
method is illegal--even if the illegality were to consist of actual or
threatened violence to persons or destruction of property. Policing of
such conduct is left wholly to the states. 1I"' Citing the Allen Bradley
case, Mr. Justice Jackson pointed out that "as to coercive tactics in
labor controversies, we have said of the National Labor Relations Act
what is equally true of the Labor Management Act of 1947, that 'ConPurpose and
gress designedly left open an area for state control.' ""
objectives in picketing cases, however, were declared to be within the
exclusive province of the federal government. As the Court said, "...
it is the objectives only and not the tactics of a strike which bring it
within the power of the Federal Board.""'
Having once spelled out the doctrine of preemption in its application
154a. 336 U.S. 245, 253 (1949).
154b. Ibid.
154c. Id. at 263.
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to the field of labor relations, the Supreme Court found no difficulty in
adapting it to specific situations. In International Union et al. v. O'Brien
et al. it struck down a Michigan statute which placed limitations on the
right to strike. In Amalgamated Association et al. v. W.E.R.B. it declared unconstitutional a statute which forbade strikes among public
utility workers. In both cases, the Court held that Congress by its action
had expressly safeguarded the right to engage in concerted activities
including the right to strike. Lest undue emphasis be placed on the
phrase "peaceful strikes," the Supreme Court subsequently held that
stranger picketing, under the provisions of Section 7 and 13 of the
Taft-Hartley Law, was entitled to the same protection.'" The Supreme
Court, reformulated its rationale as expressed in Plankinton, Packing
Co. et al. v. W.E.R.B. et al. and International Union et al. v. O'Brien
et al., in the following language:
"Section 7 of the Labor Management Relations Act not only guarantees the right
of self-organization and the right to strike, but also guarantees to individual employees the 'right to refrain from any or all of such activities,' at least in the
absence of a union shop or similar contractual arrangement applicable to the
individual. Since the NLRB was given jurisdiction to enforce the rights of the
employees, it was clear that the Federal Act had occupied this field to the exclusion
of state regulation. Plankinton and O'Brien both show that states may not
regulate in respect to rights guaranteed by Congress in § 7."160

The question of preemption is one upon which the states are in sharp
conflict. California, 1 7 Utah,"' Minnesota'0 9 and Pennsylvania'
have
all ruled that the field of labor relations in interstate commerce has been
occupied by Congress and the states are powerless to exercise any

jurisdiction absent violence, or its equivalent. New York, 101 Missouri,
Alabama,1

2

Oregon,

63

Arkansas,

"

'

Louisiana,esb

1

°

Michigan, 0e

01

and

155. N. L. R. B. v. International Rice Milling Co. et al., 341 U.S. 665 (1951).
156.
157.

Amalgamated Ass'n et al. v. W. E. R. B., 340 U. S. 383, 390 n. 12 (1951).
Matter of DeSilva, 33 Cal. 2d 76, 199 P. 2d 6 (1948); Gerry v. Superior Court,

32 Cal.2d 119, 194 P. 2d 689 (1948).
158. Utah v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 233 P. 2d 685 (Utah), cert. den., 342
U.S. 869 (1951).
159. Faribault Daily News Inc. v. International Typographical Union, 53 N., . 2d
36 (Minn. 1952); Norris Grain Co. v. Nordaas, 46 N.W. 2d 94 (Minn. 1950).
159a. Garner v. Teamsters Union, - Pa. (Feb. 13, 1953); Wilkes Sportswear
Inc. v. I.L.G.W.U., 29 LAB. REL. REP. (Ref. Man.) 2300 (1951).
160. Goodwins Inc. et al. v. Hagedorn et al., 303 N.Y. 300, 101 N.E. 2d 697 (1951).
161. Kincaid-Webber Motor Co. v. Quinn et a., 241 S.W. 2d 886 (Mo. 1951).
162. Montgomery Bldg. & Construction Trades Council et al v. Ledbetter Erection
Co., 256 Ala. 678, 57 So.2d 112 (1951), cert. granted, 343 U.S. 962 (1952). Writ dismissed upon ground that judgment sought to be reviewed was not final. 97 L.
Ed. Advance 127 (1952). However, in Russell v. U. A.W., 31 LAB. REL. REP,. (Ref.
Man.) 2214 (1952), the Alabama Circuit Court, Morgan County, held that a state
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other states have all ruled that, despite the action of Congress, in adopting the Taft-Hartley Law, there remain areas to which state jurisdiction attaches. Delaware has taken the position that where an unfair labor practice charge has been filed by an employer with the
National Labor Relations Board, which thereafter informed the employer that there was no basis for the charge, jurisdiction should be
declined as a matter of discretion.103'
In the first cases to arise in New York involving the question of preemption, the Court of Appeals in Costaro et al. v. Simons et al.," held
that it had no jurisdiction to grant relief where the acts complained of
were specifically set forth in the Taft-Hartley Law as unfair labor
practices.
However, when the issue of preemption was again presented in
Goodwins, the court sought to carve out an area into which the exercise
of Congressional power had not flowed and to reserve this area for
state regulation.
It is perhaps sufficient to say of the Goodwins decision that, since the
illegality found by the court to exist, lay within the sphere of objectives,
the court had no jurisdiction (under the International Union et al. v.
W.E.R.B. et al. case) over the subject-matter of the action. There is
another reason for believing that the concerted activity of the kind
involved in the Goodwins case is well within the field which Congress
occupied to the exclusion of the States. The nature of the illegality
which concerned the court--compelling an employer to commit an
unfair labor practice-seems peculiarly a problem of federal rather than
state concern. Certainly, picketing under those circumstances is as
much a matter of federal concern as picketing for the purpose of corncourt had no jurisdiction over an action brought by a worker to recover damages from
a union for interference with the right to work and alleged violence, inasmuch as

such conduct constituted an unfair labor practice under the provisions of Section 8
(b) (1) of the Taft-Hartley Law.
163. Oregon v. Dobson, 245 P.2d 903 (Ore. 1952).
163a. Lion Oil Co. v. Marsh, 30 LAB. RFL. RP,. (Ref. Man.) 2284 (Ark. Sup. Ct.

1952).
163b. Huff Truck Lines v. General Truck Drivers, 30 L,%. REL. RE. (ReL Man.)
2571 (La. Dist. Ct. 1952); Southern Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers Ass'n,
30 LAB. REL. REP. (Ref. Mlan.) 2137 (La. Dist. Ct. 1952).

163c. Winkelman Bros. Apparel, Inc. v. Local Union, 31 LAB. RrM REP. (Ref.
Man.) 2016 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1952); Hall Steel Co. v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, 30 LAB. REL. REP. (Ref. Mlan.) 2717 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1952).
163d. Corrado Bros. v. Building & Construction Trade Council, 30 Ln. Ra
REP.
(Ref. Mlan.) 2154 (Del. Ch. Ct. 1952).
164. 302 N.Y. 318, 98 N.E..2d 454 (1951); Ryan v. Simons, 277 App. Div. 1000
(2d Dep't 1950), aff'd, 302 N.Y. 742, 98 N.Ez2d 707, cerl. den., 342 U.S. 897 (1951).
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pelling an employer to recognize one union where another union is the
certified bargaining agent-a concerted activity outlawed by the TaftHartley Law." 5 If Congress had desired to proscribe recognition picketing where there were rival unions and a representation proceeding was
pending, it could easily have done so. Its failure to treat with this
situation is an indication that Congress meant this to be one of the
weapons in the arsenal of free collective bargaining. When this "failure"
on the part of Congress is coupled with the statement contained both
in the Senate Report and the House Conference Report that the primary
strike for recognition without a Board certification is not proscribed,
the intention of Congress to leave such action free and untrammelled
and beyond restraint from any source becomes so clear that it is not
open to dispute.
Some six months after Goodwins, the Appellate Division, First Department, decided Art Steel Co. v. Velazquez. 0 0 That case involved
violence and picketing concededly in violation of Section 8(b) (4) (C) of
the Taft-Hartley Law. The court divided sharply. Three opinions were
written. The majority opinion of Mr. Justice Callahan, concurred in
by Mr. Justice Dore, held that violence afforded a basis *for state jurisdiction. The majority, however, were of the opinion that, once jurisdiction obtained, the state courts were free to dispose of the entire
controversy. Mr. Justice Shientag dissented upon the ground that state
power was limited exclusively to the question of violence. This problem must still be resolved by higher authority.
Mr. Justice Van Voorhis, with whom Mr. Justice Cohn concurred,
wrote a separate opinion in which he based jurisdiction upon the fact
that the cause of action set forth in the complaint preexisted the labor
relations acts and were not created by them. The doctrine of preemption, he held, applied only to rights created by labor acts. It did
not apply to rights antedating those acts. Inasmuch as the complaint
alleged that the picketing resulted from a breach of contract, a cause of
action which existed prior to the Taft-Hartley Law, the doctrine of
preemption had no application at least until the National Labor Relations Board assumed jurisdiction of an unfair practice charge. This
vexing problem, too, must still be resolved by higher authority.
Since the cases decided by the United States Supreme Court on
the question of preemption all arose out of state statutes there is no
decision dealing with the restrictions on state common law jurisdiction
arising from the federal supremacy clause. However, in view of the
165.
166.

61 STAT. 140, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (b) (1947).
280 App. Div. 76, 111 N.Y.S. 2d 198 (1st Dep't 1952).
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determination by the Supreme Court in the restrictive covenant caseseo'
that the Federal Constitution is as binding upon the state courts as it
is upon the state legislature the path would seem to be marked.
It is difficult to hazard a guess as to what the Supreme Court will
do. Yet, if the logic of its past opinions is to flower, if the patterns established by Congress are to have meaning, the Court must ultimately
hold that Congress has preempted the entire field of purposes and objectives in labor management relations, which affect interstate commerce, and that it has entrusted the administration of this field to the
NLRB and its enforcement to the federal courts.l1s Such a decision, if
made, would render the state courts impotent, under the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution to apply concurrent or divergent systems of
law to the same set of facts and would prohibit them from enjoining that
which the federal law allows.
Under such circumstances, the NLRB alone would have jurisdiction
to determine, subject to review by the federal courts at the instance
of an aggrieved party, which concerted activities of the union are protected and which are unlawful under Section 7 of the Taft-Hartley Law;
which activities, because unprotected, call only for employer retributive
economic pressure through self-help.
Section 7 grants to employees "the right to self-organization,
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the
right to refrain from any or all such activities ... "
Section 8(a) (1) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7."
Section 8(b) (1) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization or its agents to restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7....",
Since objectives of "concerted activities" are in the first instance,
within "the power of the National Labor Relations Board,""" nothing
that has been said is intended to convey the impression that the Board
may not adopt the "unlawful objective" test as a basis for some of its
decisions. Indeed it has already declared certain labor union objectives
167. Shelley et ux. v. Kraemer et ux., McGhee et ux. v. Sipes et ux., 334 U.S. 1
(1948).
168. Cox and Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 H1Av. L. R1m.

(1950).
169. The word "interfere" in Section 8(a) (1) isomitted from this section.
170. International Union et al. v. W.E.R.B. et al., 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
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to be illegal in a limited number of situations.171 In others it refused to
find that the objectives were illegal.Y2
However, whatever decisions the Board may make, they will at least
have the merit of uniformity in result. They will also have the advantage
of uniformity in enforcement in the sense that only the Board and no
private litigant would have the right to apply for injunctive relief either
in the federal or state courts.
In the Goodwins case, the majority of the Court of Appeals passed
over lightly the provisions of Section 8(b) (2) of the Taft-Hartley Law
which specifically make it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents "to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) . . . "
and of Section 8(a)(3) which specifically refers to "discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization; .....
Since the complaint, in that case, alleged conduct which constituted
an unfair labor practice under the Taft-Hartley Law, the court could
have consistently followed its own precedent, which it had but recently
established in Costaro et al. v. Simons et al., and should have held that
the matters complained of had been preempted by federal law and that
the door to concurrent state action had been closed.
It has been truly said that an entity within an entity is a cancer. If
dual sovereignty is premitted to eat away at the roots of our federal
system the price will be the erosion of our working democracy. Logic,
precedent and the weight of necessity all indicate that, in the accommodations inherent in federalism, the assertion of jurisdiction by the Congress
in labor-management relations has inhibited the exercise of jurisdiction
by the states.
171. Southern Steamship Co. v. N.L.R.B., 316 U.S. 31 (1942); Matter of Electronics
Equipment Co. et al., 94 N.L.R.B. 62 (1951); Matter of Mackay Radio and Telegraph
Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 740 (1951); Matter of the Hoover Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1614 (1950),
enforcement den. in part, 191 F. 2d 380 (6th Cir. 1951); Matter of Thompson Products,

Inc. et ai., 72 N.L.R.B. 886 (1947), vacating prior decision in 70 N.L.R.B. 13
(1946); Matter of American News Co. et al., 55 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1944); Note, Federal and
State Jurisdiction over Labor Relations, 53 COL. L. Rav. 258 (1953). Cf. Cox, The
Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J. 319 (1951).
172. Matter of Perry Norvell Co. et al., 80 N.L.R.B. 225 (1948); Matter of
Columbia Pictures Corp. et a., 64 N.L.R.B. 490 (1945). See also Matter of Thayer
Co., 99 N.L.R.B. No. 165 (1952), where the Board held that, because it had been
vested with exclusive primary jurisdiction over peaceful strikes affecting interstate
commerce, it is not bound by any decision of a state court as to the legality of the
objectives of any strike.
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